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Constitutionalizing Corporate Law
Elizabeth Pollman*
The Supreme Court has recently decided some of the most important
and controversial cases involving the federal rights of corporations in over two
hundred years of jurisprudence. In rulings ranging from corporate political
spending to religious liberty rights, the Court has dramatically expanded the
zone in which corporations can act free from regulation. This Article argues
these decisions represent a doctrinal shift, even from previous cases granting
rights to corporations. The modern corporate rights doctrine has put
unprecedented weight on state corporate law to act as a mechanism for resolving
disputes among corporate participants regarding the expressive and religious
activity of business corporations. The result is a new reliance on state corporate
law that gives a quasi-constitutional dimension to governance rules that were
developed in a different era and with a different focus.
The Article further illuminates the specific areas of mismatch between
modern corporate rights doctrine and state corporate law. This examination
offers two insights often overlooked in contemporary debate. First, it provides a
deeper grounding for understanding where the Court has gone wrong and the
importance of corporate governance proposals raised in the aftermath of its
recent decisions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
Second, the Article shows that the significance of the Court’s decision in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. extends beyond issues of women’s rights and sexual
orientation, as is often emphasized. The decision undermines the very
assumptions on which corporate law has been built: that private ordering and
external regulations can be relied upon to address concerns that corporate law
has been given a pass to ignore.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the founding of the United States, state corporate law has
established essential characteristics of the corporate form, including
the idea that incorporation creates an entity with separate existence.
By their very nature, corporations are legal persons. This separate
corporate identity serves several important functions, including
allowing corporations to lock in capital, limit shareholder liability, and
exist in perpetuity.1 These attributes enable corporations to attract
long-term and large-scale investment to grow businesses into lasting
institutions.2
1.
For literature on the perpetual nature of the corporation, see Andrew A. Schwartz, The
Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764 (2012); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time
Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015). For literature on “asset partitioning,” and locking capital into the
corporation, see Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 423–24 (2003); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 392–93 (2000).
2.
Blair, supra note 1, at 387.
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But while state corporate law provides the means for creating
corporations with these useful legal features, other areas of law have
had to determine the treatment of corporations. The most prominent
example is the question of how to treat corporations under the U.S.
Constitution, which does not expressly refer to corporations but does
establish rights for “persons” and “citizens.”3 Statutes, both state and
federal, also raise interpretation issues when they do not expressly
include corporations or define “persons” to include corporations.
For nearly two centuries, the Supreme Court has determined the
scope of corporate rights without significant incursion into the
development of state corporate law. The Court has long granted
constitutional rights to corporations based on the rationale that
corporations are associations of people from whom rights can be
derived.4 In the nineteenth century, the Court extended contract and
property rights to corporations.5 By the early twentieth century, the
Court recognized corporate criminal liability and granted corporations
certain protections related to searches and trials.6 The Court has also
recognized limits to the scope of corporate rights, for example denying
corporations the privilege against self-incrimination and status as
“citizens” for purposes of privileges and immunities.7 Some of the limits
the Court has drawn for corporations, such as a distinction between
property and liberty protections,8 have faded over time in cases

3.
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 10–15 (2010).
4.
See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2015) (arguing that the Court’s
characterization of corporations as associations made sense through much of the nineteenth
century, but became a poor fit for describing the wider spectrum of corporations that emerged by
the late nineteenth century).
5.
E.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding that
corporations may claim protection under the Contracts Clause); Pembina Consolidated Silver
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (noting that corporations are
included within the meaning of “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment); Minneapolis & St.
Lewis R.R. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (“[C]orporations can invoke the benefits of
provisions of the constitution and laws which guaranty to persons the enjoyment of property, or
afford to them the means for its protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.”).
6.
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909)
(recognizing corporate criminal liability); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71 (1906) (holding that
corporations enjoy Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
but may not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
7.
E.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839) (holding that
corporations are not “citizens” for purposes of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause); see
also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178–82 (1868) (same).
8.
Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (stating that the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is “the liberty of natural, not artificial persons”); see also
Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment 4–23
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involving the speech and press rights of media corporations,9 and in the
civil rights era when the Court recognized the associational and speech
rights of nonprofit membership organizations.10 This jurisprudence has
had broad significance for corporations in society, but through the late
twentieth century it did not meaningfully impact the development of
state corporate law, which was widely understood as private law.
A new dynamic between federal corporate rights and state
corporate law has emerged that has been largely overlooked. With the
Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., business
corporations can now claim unprecedented rights in the realms of
speech and religious liberty.11 Scholars and commentators in various
areas of law have observed this dramatic expansion of corporate rights
and many of the doctrinal and practical consequences that have
followed.12 But what has gone nearly unnoticed is that in expanding
corporate rights, the Supreme Court has pointed to state corporate law
as the mechanism for resolving disputes among corporate participants.
For example, in Citizens United, the Court left to “the procedures of
corporate democracy” the question of whose voice is expressed through
the corporation and the treatment of dissenting voices.13 In Hobby
Lobby, the Court likewise leaned on state corporate law to determine
the religious identity of a business corporation and to resolve disputes
among corporate participants regarding religious exercise.14 The result
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining the Court’s parsing of the Fourteenth
Amendment through the early twentieth century).
9.
See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 244 (1936).
10. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460–62 (1958).
11. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (extending statutory
free exercise rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to closely held corporations
owned and controlled by shareholders with sincerely held religious beliefs); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that corporations have the First Amendment
right to make unlimited independent political expenditures).
12. This literature is too voluminous to cite comprehensively, but includes articles in
constitutional law, election law, law and religion and corporate law. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010);
Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011);
Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, On
Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign
Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press
Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech,
124 HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010).
13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
14. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
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is a new reliance on state corporate law that gives governance rules a
quasi-constitutional dimension that was not originally part of their
DNA.
This Article identifies and critiques how recent Supreme Court
decisions have upended the traditional function and domain of state
corporate law. This observation leads to two useful contributions. First,
it shines light on the uncomfortable fit between modern corporate rights
doctrine and state corporate law. Elaborating the ways that corporate
rights jurisprudence has miscalculated corporate law’s ability to carry
out the tasks assigned to it provides a deeper grounding for
understanding where the Court has gone wrong and the importance of
corporate governance proposals raised in the aftermath of Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby.15 Second, it shows that by allowing business
corporations to opt out of generally applicable federal regulation, Hobby
Lobby has the potential to undermine the assumptions on which
corporate law has been built: that private ordering and external
regulations can be relied upon to address concerns that corporate law
has been given a pass to ignore.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the
development of corporate law as within the purview of the states. It
traces how state corporate law originally served as a constraint on
corporate activity, but over time liberalized to serve an enabling role
with a focus on the business interests of shareholders, directors, and
officers. Concerns about other corporate participants, stakeholders, and
the public, and the negative externalities that corporations create, are
primarily handled outside of corporate law. Part II contends that recent
Supreme Court decisions have established a new relationship between
corporate rights jurisprudence and state corporate law. Although the
Court has a history of granting corporations protections under the
15. Scholars have offered a host of such corporate governance proposals. See, e.g., Bebchuk
& Jackson, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing lawmakers should develop special rules governing who
makes corporate political spending decisions); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 925 (2013) (arguing for SEC
disclosure rules for corporate political spending); James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on
Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 251, 265 (2013) (arguing for increased scrutiny beyond
business judgment rule review of corporate political spending); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions,
Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 805
(2012) [hereinafter Sachs, Unions] (arguing that unions and corporations should be treated
symmetrically with respect to opt-out rights for political spending); Margaret V. Sachs, Social
Proposals Under Rule 14a-8: A Fall Back Remedy in an Era of Congressional Inaction, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 931, 941–42 (2012) (discussing shareholder proposals as a solution to concerns
about Citizens United); Ronald Gilson & Michael Klausner, That’s My Money You’re Using, FORBES
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0329/opinions-citizens-united-corporateshareholders-on-my-mind.html [https://perma.cc/9LCW-ETEJ] (arguing for a mandatory annual
shareholder vote on whether the board is authorized to engage in corporate political activity).
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Constitution, in recent years the Court’s decisions granting rights to
corporations have put new weight on state corporate law. Part III
examines the uncomfortable fit between modern corporate rights
doctrine and state corporate law. It focuses in particular on the Court’s
assumption that business corporations are “associations” that provide
for effective “corporate democracy,” oversights concerning the fit of
corporate law principles such as fiduciary duties, and
misunderstandings about corporate law participants. Further, the Part
discusses the impact of Hobby Lobby on corporate law’s foundational
assumption that external regulations can address the interests of
nonshareholder corporate participants.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE LAW AS WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF THE STATES AND AS INTERNAL FIRM GOVERNANCE
Two key points about the development of corporate law are
essential to understanding the import of the Court’s recent expansion
of corporate rights. First, corporate law developed primarily as a matter
of state statutory and common law, and its focus was on the business
interests of the shareholders, directors, and officers. Second, although
corporate law started on a different path, it settled into an equilibrium
in which corporate law is enabling, and concerns about stakeholders
and the impact of corporate activity and power on society are chiefly
addressed by laws external to corporate law. Understanding these two
points and their historical grounding is essential to understanding the
latent federalism issues presented by the modern corporate rights
doctrine and the heavy weight it has put on state corporate law.
A. Corporate Law as State Business Law
A corporation comes into being with a charter, which reflects a
grant of authority from a sovereign.16 In the colonial period, nearly all
corporations were churches, charities, educational institutions, and
municipalities; business corporations were few in number.17 According
to William Blackstone’s Commentaries, corporations were created “for

16. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129 (3d ed. 2005); JAMES W.
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
1780–1970, at 8–9, 14 (1970).
17. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 129; HURST, supra note 16, at 7; RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855 at 3 (1982). For a discussion of the
proliferation of corporate charters after the colonial period, see Walter Werner, Corporation Law
in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 1616–17 (1981).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661115

2016]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING CORPORATE LAW

645

the advantage of the public.”18 Corporate law was in its infancy and
there was little English law to draw upon for business corporations.19
Historian James Willard Hurst explained, “to the end of the eighteenth
century in the United States law had developed no separate policy or
rules on business corporations; the same legislative committees
handled applications for all types of corporate charters, and when
questions arose, courts applied to business corporations the judge-made
law that had developed out of problems of ecclesiastical, philanthropic,
and municipal corporations.”20
Incorporation offered businesses several advantages such as the
potential for perpetual existence and making it easier to raise and lock
in capital.21 These advantages were possible because of an essential
characteristic of the corporation: it is a distinct legal entity, separate
from the humans associated with it—the shareholders, directors,
employees, and creditors.22 Incident to the corporation’s existence was
the ability to hold and transfer property, sue and be sued, and contract
in the corporate name.23 Unlike partnerships, the corporation could
remain a stable entity despite changes in the body of shareholders.24
But the rights of business corporations were limited during this early
time.25 As Blackstone noted, “no trading company is . . . allowed to
make by-laws, which may affect the king’s prerogative, or the common
profit of the people, unless they be approved by the chancellor,
treasurer, and chief justices, or the judges of assise in their circuits.”26

18. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law
History 28 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 812, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564708 [https://perma.cc/9NMS-2C3Q].
19. See HURST, supra note 16, at 7–9:
In sum, when we began making important use of the corporation for business in the
United States from about 1780, there was little relevant legal experience on which to
draw . . . . The one definite inheritance was the idea that some positive act of the
sovereign was necessary to create corporate status.
20. Id. at 7; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 137:
For all practical purposes, the courts created a body of corporation law out of next to
nothing. Old decisions and doctrines, from the time when most corporations were
academies, churches, charities and cities, had little to say about managers and directors
that was germane to the world of business corporations.
21. SEAVOY, supra note 17, at 4; see also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 766.
22. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 73 (2010) (“The
corporation has been regarded from its inception as a legal entity distinct from its owners.”); Strine
& Walter, supra note 18, at 18 (noting that the separate legal identity of the corporation “is the
whole point of corporate law after all”).
23. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (KB); HURST, supra note 16, at 19.
24. HURST, supra note 16, at 19.
25. Strine & Walter, supra note 18, at 18.
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *464.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661115

646

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3:639

In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison
proposed that, as part of a nationally integrated economy, Congress be
given the power “[t]o grant charters of incorporation in cases where the
Public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may
be incompetent.”27 The delegates could not agree on the scope of the
power, however, and the proposal for federal incorporation was
defeated.28 One of the founding fathers, James Wilson, did note that
such power was already included in the Commerce Clause and its power
to regulate trade.29 The issue arose again in the debate over Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s proposal to create a national bank.
Congress passed the bill incorporating the Bank of the United States in
1791, following heated debate regarding whether Congress had such
power to charter the corporation and concerns about the influence of a
corporation closely tied to the federal government.30 In McCulloch v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court validated Congress’ chartering of the
bank as a constitutional exercise of its Article I powers.31
Despite the ability of the federal government to charter
corporations, the government rarely used such power. After the second
Bank of the United States failed to secure re-charter, the federal
government “used only a small portion of its power . . . to mobilize and
allocate resources to socially desirable investments.”32
Instead, the common early method of creating a corporation was
by obtaining an individual charter from a state legislature, generally
for a purpose consistent with public welfare.33 As Ronald Seavoy
explained, “[t]he constitutional authority for states to charter
corporations, other than banks, was never questioned. It was part of
their sovereignty not alienated to the national government.”34 Thus,
27. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 325 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
28. Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem of Power, 10 GEO.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 141 (2012).
29. Id.; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 615–16 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
30. Speir, supra note 28, at 142–43; see also Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the
Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 406–13 (1997)
(discussing the debate regarding federal incorporation power).
31. 17 U.S. 316, 343 (1819).
32. SEAVOY, supra note 17, at xi–xii (noting that the best known examples of such use of
power were “the tariff and land grants after 1850”).
33. See id. at 5; see also HURST, supra note 16, at 15–17 (discussing how states chartered
corporations during this early period for “activities of some community interest—supplying
transport, water, insurance, or banking facilities”); cf. Werner, supra note 17, at 1616 (noting that
“[a]ll corporations were public instrumentalities before 1800, but not thereafter” and that “states
used their charter power extensively”).
34. SEAVOY, supra note 17, at 57; see also Mark, supra note 30, at 407 (“[N]either the federal
government nor the states could lay sole claim to the power to incorporate.”); id. at 416
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business corporations “were promoted by individuals operating almost
entirely under state laws.”35 From these early years, state statutory law
defined the basic framework of corporate law and state judge-made
common law built upon that framework.36
The next stage was the passage of general incorporation
statutes, which equalized the opportunity for incorporation.37 Over the
course of the nineteenth century, states moved from a system of
exclusively granting charters by discretionary special acts of the
legislature to a system in which such special acts were more limited,
reserved for particular businesses such as for railroads and banks, and
other businesses could seek a corporate charter without specific
involvement of the legislature.38
Until the late nineteenth century, state corporate law served as
a constraining force on corporate behavior. States used several
approaches to constrain business corporations and protect the public
interest: including restrictions in charters concerning business purpose,
capitalization, and time durations, providing for some amount of
shareholder liability, narrowly interpreting the powers granted by
charters, and creating independent regulatory commissions.39 Such
restrictions were understood as permissible constraints within the
sovereignty of the states, and not infringements of property or
associational rights.40 Indeed, “corporations remained creatures of the

(“Incorporation was thus a power coextensive with legislative power. It was, in that sense, simply
a constitutionally unallocated power of government.”); Speir, supra note 28, at 151–52 (“Of course,
no state ever went so far as to deny its legislature the power of incorporation. That power was said
to inhere in sovereignty.”).
35. SEAVOY, supra note 17, at xi–xii. As Hurst explained, after independence the authority
to issue corporate charters was understood as vested in the legislative branch rather than
executive. HURST, supra note 16, at 115; see also Mark, supra note 30, at 409:
The sovereign power to create corporations thus devolved from England to the former
colonies, not in their confederated form, but to each of the former colonies specifically,
and within the structures of the new state governments, to the legislatures . . . . [S]tate
legislatures immediately took over where the crown had left off, granting charters to
corporations of all varieties.
36. HURST, supra note 16, at 122–25.
37. SEAVOY, supra note 17, at 6; Speir, supra note 28, at 152.
38. SEAVOY, supra note 17, at 9–10; HURST, supra note 16, at 21; Susan Pace Hamill, From
Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 81, 101 (1999). Many states continued to issue special charters for certain types of
corporations such as railroads and banks until the 1930s when federal regulation emerged to
regulate these industries. Hamill, supra, at 146–59.
39. HURST, supra note 16, at 39, 45–47; SEAVOY, supra note 17, at 237.
40. Speir, supra note 28, at 180; e.g., Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
127, 167 (1804) (Marshall, J.):
[T]his body . . . in its corporate capacity, is the mere creature of the act to which it owes
its existence, [and] . . . it may correctly be said to be precisely what the incorporating
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state in the sense that they were granted a legal existence on the
condition that they operate within the constraints imposed upon them
by society.”41
Furthermore, states reserved authority to allow the legislature
to amend or repeal corporate charters. State reservations of authority
came about as a response to the Supreme Court’s 1819 ruling in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward that a corporate charter was a contract
protected from impairment under the Contracts Clause of the federal
Constitution.42 In dicta, Justice Story noted in his concurring opinion
that state legislatures were the source and creators of corporate
charters and therefore could reserve authority in the original grant if
they wanted to later have the ability to alter or repeal a charter.43 After
Dartmouth College, in response to concerns about the economic and
political influence of corporations, state legislatures began including
reservation clauses in corporate charters, state constitutions, and
general incorporation statutes.44 States retained control over the
corporations that they chartered and had the power to regulate
“foreign” corporations, incorporated in other states, when they were
operating within their jurisdiction.45
The doctrines of ultra vires and quo warranto also restrained
corporations. Under the ultra vires doctrine, all corporate acts not
authorized by a corporation’s charter were null and void.46 Shareholders
were empowered to sue to enjoin any actions “beyond the powers”
enumerated in the corporate charter.47 Further, states brought quo
act has made it, to derive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of exerting its
faculties only in the manner which that act authorizes.
See generally Strine & Walter, supra note 18, at 47–51 (describing states’ broad regulation of
corporations in the nineteenth century).
41. Strine & Walter, supra note 18, at 7.
42. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 518 (1819).
43. See id. at 712 (Story, J., concurring) (“If the legislature mean to claim such an authority,
it must be reserved in the grant.”).
44. See HURST, supra note 16, at 63 (“[T]he states came commonly to qualify corporate
charters by reserving authority in the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal them.”); Speir, supra
note 28, at 153 (explaining many states “insisted that a general power to amend or repeal corporate
charters should be . . . reserved to the legislature”).
45. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 531 (1839); George W. Wickersham, State Control
of Foreign Corporations, 19 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1909).
46. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 94 (John Lanthrop ed., Little, Brown and Co., 11th ed. 1882) (1832) (“[T]he general
powers of a corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”); Albert
J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 35 YALE L.J. 13,
23–28 (1925); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1662–63 (1988).
47. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
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warranto actions against corporations for exercising unauthorized
powers or failing to undertake the business for which they were
chartered.48 As Herbert Hovenkamp explained, “[t]his notion of
corporate obligation rested on the premise that the proprietor of the
corporation had been given a set of rights to something that was in the
public interest but which one could not do without the state’s
permission.”49 Although quo warranto actions could only be brought by
the states, they had a powerful impact because they could result in the
dissolution of the corporation.50
Corporate law provided still more limitations on corporate
activity, even after general incorporation statutes swept across the
states.51 For example, through much of the nineteenth century,
corporations could not merge without unanimous shareholder
consent.52 Until the turn of the century, many general incorporation
statutes included significant restrictions, such as restrictions on
capitalization and holding stock in other companies.53 It was not until
the late nineteenth century that New Jersey, the “traitor state,” passed
its path-breaking liberal general incorporation law, attracting
chartering revenues from businesses incorporating in the state.54
Around this time a system of federal incorporation was again
broadly debated. Proponents argued that a federal system would
provide valuable uniformity and prevent states from competing for
charters, which could allow corporations to evade one state’s
requirements by reincorporating in another.55
1279, 1281, 1302, 1307 (2001) (“Limiting the corporation’s legal authority to certain powers
enumerated in the corporate charter, the doctrine was considered an important tool to protect the
state’s interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the shareholders
from managerial overreaching.”).
48. See id. at 1309 (commenting on states’ “powerful” quo warranto proceeding); Hovenkamp,
supra note 46, at 1660 (noting that quo warranto actions “were common in the first half of the
nineteenth century”).
49. Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 1659.
50. Id. at 1659–60.
51. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 208 (“The pervasive
adoption of general incorporation statutes by many states during the latter half of the 19th century
did not signal abdication of the regulatory notion of corporate law. Some states continued to insist
that corporate charters include specific limitations on corporate purposes and powers . . . .”).
52. E.g., Mason v. Finch, 28 Mich. 282, 286 (1873) (“There is nothing but unanimous consent
which can bind any member of an unincorporated company by any action not within the terms of
the association.”); HURST, supra note 16, at 56–57.
53. Millon, supra note 51, at 209–10.
54. HURST, supra note 16, at 69, 73 (discussing New Jersey’s progressive corporate laws and
its resulting economic impact); see also Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, Part II,
MCCLURE’S, May 1905, at 46–47 (same).
55. See James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE L.J. 273, 273 (1902)
(lobbying for national incorporation to prevent “interstate warfare”); Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed
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The champions for federal chartering ultimately lost. The topic
would become one of occasional renewed interest, but this interest
never produced meaningful changes.56 And in 1913, when thengovernor Woodrow Wilson persuaded the New Jersey state legislature
to reform its liberal rule allowing corporations to hold stock in other
corporations and thereby create holding companies, New Jersey
corporations fled to Delaware.57 With this advantage, Delaware
captured a lead in attracting incorporations that it has maintained to
this day.58
The competitive chartering that started in a small number of
states ultimately set a national pattern. In the early part of the
twentieth century, the old internal restraints on corporations faded and
doctrines such as ultra vires weakened.59 States broadly adopted a new
type of general incorporation act. The new corporate law statutes
provided for a standard corporate structure, with management
centralized in the board of directors, presumed limited liability for the
shareholders, and certain other characteristics that had come to be
understood as essential to the corporate form. State courts and
Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 165 (1982) (calling for
federal incorporation to promote uniformity).
56. E.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal
Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917, 930 (1941); Wiley B. Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern
Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 304, 340 (1937); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, Part Two, 59 HARV. L. REV. 883, 883 (1946); see also Mark
J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 602–03 (2003) (discussing historical
debates over federal incorporation). Proposals for a federal corporation law have continued to
present day. E.g., Alex Marshall, How to Get Business to Pay Its Share, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/opinion/solving-the-corporate-tax-code-puzzle.html
[https://perma.cc/9TF7-LSC4] (arguing in favor of a National Companies Act).
57. HURST, supra note 16, at 69–70, 73; Roe, supra note 56, at 610. This jurisdictional
competition was possible because of the internal affairs doctrine, which allows incorporators a
choice of law regardless of the physical location of the business.
58. E.g., Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
539–40 (2001); see also, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 107 (2006) (“Delaware has a population less than onethird of one percent of the nation, but it is the state of incorporation of over 50 percent of U.S.
public companies and 60 percent of the Fortune 500.”). For literature in the “race to the top and
bottom” debate, see William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 663–72 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254–58 (1977); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to
the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW.
U.L. REV. 913, 914–16 (1982); Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1992); Marcel Kahan
& Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 739 (2002);
Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the
Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (2002).
59. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 16, at 161; Greenfield, supra note 47, at 1310–13;
Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 1662–68; Strine & Walter, supra note 18, at 73.
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legislatures abandoned the unanimity requirement for shareholder
voting on important questions of corporate policy.60 Mergers and
fundamental corporate changes required merely majority shareholder
approval with appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders.61
Moreover, the new corporate laws were enabling—they allowed
for increasing customization, empowering corporate promoters and
participants to design the corporation’s articles and bylaws as they saw
fit.62 Statutory limits on capitalization and purpose disappeared, and
authorization for holding companies and no-par and preferred stock
appeared.63 As James Willard Hurst has explained:
The new style of corporation statutes in effect judged that corporate status had no social
relevance save as a device legitimized by its utility to promote business. The obverse of
this judgment was that regulation of business activity was no longer to be deemed a
proper function of the law of corporate organization. The function of corporation law was
to enable businessmen to act, not to police their action.64

Upon this enabling framework, a large body of state corporate
law developed.65 Courts, for example, developed doctrine specifying that
directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders.66 At the same time, courts developed
rules deferring to the business judgment of the board of directors.67
With the ubiquity of business corporations and an increasing diversity
of corporations, including large corporations with separated share
ownership and control, new concerns with corporate power arose after
the 1920s.68 They focused on the relationship among shareholders and
between shareholders and managers; state corporate law shifted to take
little formal account of other participants, such as employees and
creditors, in the governance structure.69
60. Millon, supra note 51, at 215.
61. Id.; Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 548
n.7 (1927).
62. HURST, supra note 16, at 70–71, 120–21.
63. Id. at 84. For a discussion criticizing the “enablingism” of corporate law, see GREENFIELD,
supra note 58, at 16–20.
64. HURST, supra note 16, at 70.
65. Id. at 123, 71.
66. Id. at 98.
67. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 309–10 (1998);
see also S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97–100
(1979).
68. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1700–12 (discussing the increasing use of the
corporate form through the nineteenth century and the rise of huge, modern corporations by the
early twentieth century, which broadened the spectrum of corporations in existence).
69. Creditors were left to look out for themselves and rely on their contractual dealings for
protection. HURST, supra note 16, at 54–55. The twentieth century also brought about credit
ratings and information, aiding creditors in taking preventive action on their own. Id. at 54. This
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One of the primary concerns of corporate law centered on the
ability of majority shareholders to oppress minority shareholders in
closely held corporations.70 The minority shareholders in such
corporations typically had no market to sell their shares and were
without protection from the majority vote.71 Early twentieth-century
courts often refused to enforce shareholder agreements to pool votes or
require unanimity on basic business matters, on the basis that “each
participant was entitled to the independent judgment of each of his
fellows and to the benefits of majority rule.”72 At the same time, courts
recognized that a single body of corporate law did not fit all situations,
and doctrines arose trying to manage the concerns.73
The most famous example is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., involving
an oppression claim by minority shareholders in a closely held
corporation.74 At trial, majority shareholder and director Henry Ford
gave testimony that led the court to believe he was running the
corporation as a “semi-eleemosynary” institution for the benefit of
employees and consumers and only “incidentally to make money,”
which came at the expense of the minority shareholders denied
dividends.75 The court stepped in to protect the minority shareholders,
stating, “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end.”76
Another major concern in corporate law centered on corporations
with dispersed shareholding. With the rise of giant modern corporations
with large numbers of passive shareholders, concern arose that the
shareholders lacked means to supervise the directors and managers
controlling the corporation.77 In addition, investors increasingly
represented a broader range of the American public, whose concern was
was in contrast to earlier efforts by state corporate law to provide safeguards for creditors and
employees. Millon, supra note 51, at 210–11.
70. HURST, supra note 16, at 75–76, 78.
71. Id. at 78.
72. Id. at 79–81. It was not until well into the twentieth century that some states designed
statutory provisions to address the special circumstances of closely held corporations and that
courts, in a limited movement, gave effect to shareholder agreements, corporate articles
conditioning board action on shareholder consent, or classifying shares to guarantee particular
shareholders representation on the board. Id.
73. See Smith, supra note 67, at 312–15 (discussing the origins of the shareholder minority
oppression doctrine).
74. 204 Mich. 459, 492–510 (1919); see also Smith, supra note 67, at 315, 320 (“Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. is best viewed as a minority oppression case.”).
75. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 504, 507; Smith, supra note 67, at 317.
76. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507.
77. HURST, supra note 16, at 50, 85. The seminal work of this period is Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means’s book, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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not short-term profit but rather appreciation and income for long-term
savings such as retirement.78 Such shareholders needed reliable
information, but state corporate law failed to impose effective reporting
requirements.79
In the 1930s federal law stepped in to provide a layer of
regulation above state corporate law, aimed at investor protection and
maintaining confidence in the securities markets. Following the 1929
stock market collapse and the Great Depression, Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933, which imposed disclosure requirements on
original public issues, and the Exchange Act of 1934, which imposed
ongoing disclosure requirements for publicly reporting companies.80
Subsequently, federal regulation increased, with the Securities and
Exchange Commission promulgating rules on proxy voting and
shareholder proposals.81
This layer of federal regulation increased the flow of information
available about some corporations, but did not fully democratize
governance. Management nominated directors for election to the board
and defined other key issues to be put to shareholder vote.82
Shareholder proposals generally had to be non-binding in nature.83
Furthermore, when Congress began to act in the 1930s, it did so
in limited, piecemeal fashion that did not significantly interfere with
the traditional allocation of state corporate law as governing the
standards for internal governance.84 Although federal regulation has
increased over time, this allocation has endured.85 Congress has
sporadically regulated corporate governance and related business
matters, typically after corporate scandals or economic crises, as with

78. HURST, supra note 16, at 86.
79. Id. at 90.
80. Id. at 91.
81. Id. at 94–95.
82. Id. at 96–97.
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2015) (noting that a company can exclude a shareholder
proposal that is “not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction
of the company’s organization”).
84. See HURST, supra note 16, at 140 (“The Supreme Court never ruled that the Tenth
Amendment prevented Congress from preempting the field of corporation law, for Congress never
made so broad an assertion of power as to present the question.”).
85. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 290 (2005)
(noting that SOX-related reforms were “limited” and “not based on a policy decision to effect a
major ‘paradigm shift’ in the allocation of lawmaking authority between the federal government
and the states”). For a discussion of federal regulation of corporate governance and an argument
that the risk of federal action influences state corporate law, see Roe, supra note 56, at 600–32.
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the JOBS Act.86 But
at its core, corporate law has remained primarily within the purview of
the states.
B. Regulating Corporations By Law External to State Corporate Law
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, when state corporate
law began to liberalize and become more enabling, the law increasingly
turned to regulation outside the structure of the corporation to enforce
responsibility on corporations and protect various stakeholders and the
public.87 For example, the Tillman Act of 1907 prohibited corporations
from giving direct contributions to federal candidates or their
campaigns.88 When challenged, a federal court upheld the Act as
constitutional, noting: “These artificial creatures are not citizens of the
United States, and, so far as the franchise is concerned, must at all
times be held subservient and subordinate to the government and the
citizenship of which it is composed.”89
The law settled on a system in which corporate law governed the
internal structure of the corporation and laws outside of corporate law

86. For a discussion of the literature critiquing federal regulatory responses to corporate law,
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1779, 1796–821 (2011); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 18–45 (2002); Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521, 1568–604 (2005).
87. HURST, supra note 16, at 110–11 (“We now relied primarily upon legal regulations
external to the corporation’s own constitution to enforce its responsibility to its immediate
economic functions and to its broader social relations.”); Strine & Walter, supra note 18, at 79.
88. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30118
(2012)).
89. United States v. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916); see also Adam Winkler,
“Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J.
871, 873 (2004) (arguing that early twentieth century campaign finance regulation was aimed not
only at concerns about excessive corporate power but also at constraining corporate managers from
using “other people’s money” without their support and for self-serving purposes).
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provided the primary check on corporate activity.90 This division of
corporate law and external legal regimes is widely acknowledged.91
Not all have agreed with this division as a normative matter,
however. Most notably, proponents of corporate social responsibility
and progressive corporate law theorists have argued for a socially
responsive corporate law regime dedicated to the public interest.
Literature espousing “stakeholder theory” or notions of corporate social
responsibility—incorporating stakeholders and their interests in how
companies are run—emerged in the 1960s, and more fully took shape
in the 1980s and 90s.92 For example, Abram Chayes argued that people
affected by corporate activity should have a right to participate in
corporate decisionmaking.93 He wrote:
A more spacious conception of [corporate] “membership,” and one closer to the facts of
corporate life, would include all those having a relation of sufficient intimacy with the
corporation or subject to its power in a sufficiently specialized way. Their rightful share
in decisions on the exercise of corporate power would be exercised through an institutional
arrangement appropriately designed to represent the interests of a constituency of
members having a significant common relation to the corporation and its power.94

90. For a discussion of theory legitimating the government’s role in protecting and furthering
public values such as by regulating corporations, see for example Cass Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1574 (1988) (noting that the government and courts “play
a role in limiting the power of such organizations [such as corporations] without denying the
importance of their continued existence”); see also J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 10 (1993):
[C]ompanies are able to make choices which have important social consequences: they
make private decisions which have public results. It is possession of this kind of power
that gives rise to a distinct need for justification, and which forms the basis for the claim
that companies must be required to act in the public interest.
91. E.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 425 (2002) (noting
that corporate “externalities should be constrained through general welfare legislation, tort
litigation, and other forms of regulations”); Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their
Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008) (“Manager choice results in the exclusion of other stakeholder
interests from corporate law itself—protection of these interests therefore defaults to market forces
and external legal regimes.”); Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law,
57 EMORY L.J. 948, 951 (2008):
In the United States, the “internal” regulation of corporate law—for example, the legal
imposition of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty on managers and directors—is used
almost exclusively to protect shareholders or the firm itself. Other stakeholders in the
firm—for example employees, communities, or customers—are left to depend primarily
on “external” regulations, such as minimum-wage laws, environmental regulations, and
consumer safety rules.
92. Discussion of whether public corporations primarily serve an economic role for
shareholders or whether they more broadly serve society dates back to the famous Berle-Dodd
debate of the 1930s. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder
Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008).
93. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION AND
MODERN SOCIETY 41 (E. Mason ed., 1959).
94. Id.
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More recently, legal scholars in the 1990s and 2000s developed a body
of literature sometimes referred to as “progressive corporate law,”
which argues for more comprehensive, mandatory changes in corporate
law in order to serve the public interest.95 Some researchers have
focused on making the business case for corporate social responsibility
or a paradigm change, apart from altruistic and ethical justifications.96
The corporate social responsibility movement has had
significant real-world impact. Self-regulations, codes of conduct, nonbinding standards, and socially responsible investing funds have
proliferated.97
But corporate social responsibility has not changed the
fundamental division of corporate law, as enabling and focused on the
relationship of shareholders and directors, and outside legal regimes,
which are relied on to regulate specific activity as part of our
environmental laws, labor laws, etc.98 Reflecting this understanding,
corporate law scholars Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
famously went so far as to declare that “[t]here is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to
increase long-term shareholder value.”99 The Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court has argued that for-profit corporations will
seek profits for their shareholders using all legal means available and
thus we should not rely on corporations to self-regulate, but rather we
should look to the government to regulate corporations and protect
against externality risks.100 As noted, these are not the only views on
the topic, and should not be understood as a prescriptive
recommendation here, but as a descriptive matter they illustrate
commonly held notions concerning the focus of corporate law on

95. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 58; LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW (1995); Greenfield, supra note 91, at 952.
96. See, e.g., Matteo Tonello, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV.
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 26, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard
.edu/corpgov/2011/06/26/the-business-case-for-corporate-social-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/
Y3QG-CB52] (summarizing recent research justifying CSR on an economic basis).
97. See, e.g., Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Inv., 2014 Report on U.S. Sustainable
and Responsible Investing Trends, USSIF FOUNDATION (2014), http://www.ussif.org/Files/
Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT59-Z7XT].
98. See Millon, supra note 51, at 228 (“Attractive as corporate social responsibility claims
might be to many people, the calls for reform have had no discernible impact on corporate law.”).
99. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
100. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 136 (2012) (“In the end, policy makers should not delude
themselves about the corporation’s ability to police itself; government still has a critical role in
setting the rules of the game.”).
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shareholders and directors and the allocation of other concerns to other
areas of law.
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZING CORPORATE LAW
Corporate law has been an engine for economic growth. It
established a legal form for enterprise with highly desirable attributes,
particularly for large business—legal personality, limited liability for
shareholders, transferable shares, and centralized management under
a board of directors.101 Beyond establishing essential characteristics of
the corporate form, it also represents a body of law that encourages
investment and constrains opportunism among corporate participants
to allow for value creation.102 As demonstrated, corporate law developed
within the purview of the states, and although corporate law started on
a different path, it became enabling and perceived as private law.
Furthermore, concerns about stakeholders and the impact of corporate
activity on society have been primarily addressed by laws external to
corporate law.
But what corporate law has not done is provide a clear answer
regarding the treatment of corporations under other areas of law. Most
notably, it does not directly answer the question of how to treat
corporations under the U.S. Constitution, which does not expressly
refer to corporations but does establish rights for “persons” and
“citizens.” It also does not answer the question with respect to state and
federal statutes that do not expressly include corporations or define
“persons” to include corporations. Nor is it clear that it is the role of
state corporate law to do so.
This Part examines the relationship between state corporate law
and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate rights. It argues
that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on corporate rights represent
a doctrinal shift from the past. For well over a hundred years, the
Supreme Court granted corporations protections under the
Constitution without relying upon corporate law mechanisms. The
Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, which
address corporate political spending and statutory protection of
religious liberty, upend the traditional function and domain of state
corporate law. They push to state corporate law the task of resolving
disputes among corporate participants on issues of social, political, and
religious dimension.
101. REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1–2 (2004).
102. Id. at 2.
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A. Pre-Modern Supreme Court Corporate Rights Jurisprudence
To understand the current doctrinal shift, and its importance, it
is helpful to first look briefly to the past. Although the Court’s corporate
rights jurisprudence decidedly changed the status of corporations vis-àvis the government,103 until recently it did not significantly impact or
give constitutional significance to the internal rules governing the
corporation.
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether
corporations were the subject of constitutional protections in early
nineteenth-century cases involving Article III diversity jurisdiction, the
Contracts Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV.104 In these cases, the Court made clear that a corporation is not a
“citizen” for purposes of Article III diversity jurisdiction, nor under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, but that the Court could
look to the natural persons composing a corporation and find that
diversity jurisdiction exists where there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the corporate shareholders and the opposing
party.105 Further, where the corporation was “endowed by private
individuals,” the Court would treat the corporate charter as a contract
covered by the protection of the Contracts Clause.106
Later in the nineteenth century, the Court recognized equal
protection and due process protections for corporations under the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.107 This line of case law has a
103. See John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal
Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 132 (Warren J. Samuels &
Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (“Recognition of the corporation as a person for constitutional purposes
. . . elevates this form of joint or collective action to a constitutional status with certain immunities
from control by the community through government.”).
104. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809); Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 666 (1819); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519, 587 (1839). For a more detailed discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence on corporate
rights, see Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629; Carl
J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577
(1990); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015).
105. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86 (“That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that
mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue
or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can
be exercised in the corporate name.”); id. at 90–91 (explaining that the Court would “consider the
character of the individuals who compose” the corporation “when they use the name of the
corporation, for the purpose of asserting their corporate rights”); Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 586–
87 (holding that when “a corporation makes a contract, it is the contract of the legal entity” which
is not a “citizen” for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
106. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 631–39.
107. See Wickersham, supra note 45, at 10 (“[I]t may be safely asserted that the only
limitation[s] upon the powers of the States to exclude foreign corporations . . . [include], first, that
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curious history starting with Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co.108 In that case, the Court’s opinion did not reach the
constitutional issue of whether corporations were “persons” within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court reporter
documented a comment from the bench to that effect in the headnotes
to the opinion.109 Subsequently, the Court relied on Santa Clara as
precedent and noted in other cases around that time that corporations
enjoyed equal protection and due process rights.110 These cases again
acknowledged rights in the context of protecting the property interests
of shareholders based on a view of the corporation as an association.111
At that time, the Court parsed the due process protection as extending
to corporate property, but explained that the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment is “the liberty of natural, not artificial,
persons.”112
The impact of these early decisions was to solidify the corporate
form as a useful vehicle for pursuing business ventures. Contract and
property rights were incidental to the very purpose of corporations. The
early decisions opened the door to the federal courts for corporations
and provided standing for Contracts Clause claims against the state.
Recognizing the corporation’s property as protected by the Due Process
Clause stabilized the corporation as a viable form of organization for
large-scale and long-term private investment. Legal personality
established by corporate law served the important function of providing
for a separation of assets and locked in capital that allowed corporations
to serve as lasting institutions over time.113 Similarly, these early
corporate rights cases bolstered the corporation as a separate entity

the regulations so prescribed shall not deprive the foreign corporations of property without due
process of law, or deny to them the equal protection of the laws.”).
108. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
109. Id. at 394–95. For a discussion of the Santa Clara case, see HOWARD JAY GRAHAM,
EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION 567 (1968); Flynn, supra note 103, at 138–49; Malcolm J. Harkins III,
The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care Act, and the
Corporate Person: How a Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 215–75 (2014); Pollman, supra note 104, at 1642–46.
110. See cases cited supra note 5.
111. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1688–96.
112. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); see also Bloch & Lamoreaux,
supra note 8, at 4–23 (explaining the Court’s parsing of the Fourteenth Amendment through the
early twentieth century); Vince S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 32), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2569305
[https://perma.cc/CL3M-VA9M] (discussing Riggs and noting that “the cases disclaiming a
corporate right to liberty under the fourteenth amendment may well be defunct”).
113. Supra note 1.
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from the government and protected the property interests of
shareholders in the corporate property.114
Notably, these early cases did not rely upon or significantly
impact state corporate law. As noted above, after Dartmouth College,
states reserved the authority to allow the legislature to amend or repeal
corporate charters. The Court’s ruling that corporations were not
citizens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause meant that states
retained authority to regulate corporations, including foreign
corporations acting within their jurisdiction.115
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were
a greater number of corporations in the United States than in previous
periods by orders of magnitude, and some of an unprecedented size,
which began to have a significant impact on society. The spread of
general incorporation statutes, the liberalization of state corporate law,
and the merger movement of the 1890s had contributed to this trend.116
In the early twentieth century, the Court acknowledged this new
dynamic with its ruling that established corporate criminal liability.
Stating that “it [could] not shut its eyes to the fact that the great
majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted
through these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is
almost entirely in their hands,” the Court held for the first time that a
corporation could be held criminally liable for acts by its agents.117
Also in the early twentieth century, the Court began to establish
certain protections for corporations in searches and trials. As potential
defendants in the criminal justice system, the Court ruled that
corporations had “waive[d] no constitutional immunities appropriate to
such body.”118 In the Court’s view, this meant that corporations had
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures because “[a] corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”119
But corporations could not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination because that is a right personal to the witness that
cannot be asserted on behalf of another, including a corporation.120 The
114. Pollman, supra note 104, at 1639.
115. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–87 (1839) (“The only rights [the
corporation] can claim are the rights which are given to it in that character.”); Wickersham, supra
note 45, at 3.
116. See supra Section I.A.
117. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909).
118. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 70 (“The [Fifth] amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself; and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third
person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation.”).
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Court’s ruling on corporate criminal liability used agency law as a
foundation for attributing the acts of employees to the corporation—a
building-block concept in corporate law—but these cases did not
otherwise incorporate state corporate law or suggest a theory of the
corporation that put weight on internal governance rules.
As the twentieth century wore on, and as First Amendment
doctrine began to develop, the distinction between the property and
liberty protections of corporations faded in a line of cases involving
speech and press rights for media corporations.121 Further, in the 1950s
and 60s, the Court recognized associational and speech rights of
nonprofit organizations such as the NAACP.122 These cases were
specific to the corporations involved. The early cases involving media
corporations focused on the freedom of press and the First Amendment,
not on the status of the parties as corporations. For example, Grosjean
v. American Press Co. involved a state statute taxing businesses selling
advertising in newspapers and other periodicals with a circulation of
more than 20,000 copies per week. The Court ruled that the statute was
“unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because it
abridge[d] the freedom of the press.”123 The Court focused
overwhelmingly on the history of the First Amendment and freedom of
the press, providing only a short paragraph to note that the Court could
apply the First Amendment to the state statute at issue through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the
case involved a corporation. The Court simply cited two cases from the
late nineteenth century recognizing that a corporation is a “person”
within the meaning of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.124
Although the Court did not substantially address the corporate status
of the newspaper corporation, nor its move to incorporate the First
Amendment through the Fourteenth with regards to the corporation,
the case did not broadly extend to corporations—it was about the rights
of the press. Furthermore, it was also a tax case, and perhaps not
perceived as significantly different in context from the property cases
from the late nineteenth century.
In the 1970s, however, the Court established commercial speech
rights for business corporations, and a new direction in the
jurisprudence began to emerge. This line of cases, starting with
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
121. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 244 (1936).
122. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460–62 (1958).
123. 297 U.S. at 251.
124. Id. at 244.
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Council,125 introduced a new rationale into the Court’s corporate rights
jurisprudence. Instead of extending protection to the corporation
derivatively in order to protect the people involved in the corporation,
the Court extended protection to the corporation in order to protect
consumers.126 The Court held that advertising is within the scope of the
First Amendment, and, because of consumers’ interest in hearing price
information, a state could not forbid pharmacists from advertising drug
prices.127
In addition to using a new rationale, which disregarded the
corporate status of the right holder, the Court’s ruling was novel in that
it provided an alarming breadth of protection to corporations and their
publication of commercial information with no expressive value. As
Tamara Piety has put it, this line of cases starting with Virginia
Pharmacy “is a disturbing development, because if the government
cannot regulate commercial speech, it cannot regulate commerce—
period.”128 Although the full impact of Virginia Pharmacy was not
apparent for some time, it seemed to have some immediate
repercussions.129
Shortly after the Court handed down Virginia Pharmacy, it
heard its first case regarding business corporations’ political speech
rights.130 In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a bank sought a
declaratory judgment that it had a First Amendment right to make
political expenditures on a referendum ballot.131 Massachusetts law
125. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
126. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1719–20.
127. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757–68; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571–72 (1980) (holding that a state could not completely ban
promotional advertising by an electrical utility).
128. TAMARA PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA 2 (2012). John Coates has argued that “corporations have increasingly displaced
individuals as direct beneficiaries of First Amendment rights, they have done so recently, but with
growing speed since Virginia Pharmacy (1976), Bellotti (1978), and Central Hudson (1980).” John
C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223–24 (2015) (citations omitted).
129. See PIETY, supra note 128, at 26:
The timing of the Bellotti decision, occurring as it did in such close proximity to Virginia
Pharmacy, suggests that the Supreme Court backed into the corporate speech
formulation in Bellotti without fully considering the appropriateness of the corporate
person as a rights holder under the First Amendment, its implications for the newly
announced commercial speech doctrine, or the possibility that there might be valid
reasons to distinguish between human beings engaging in commercial speech and
entities such as corporations doing so.
130. In the same year that the Court established commercial speech rights in Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo that limitations on campaign expenditures
constituted an unconstitutional limitation on speech under the First Amendment. 424 U.S. 1, 18
(1976).
131. 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978).
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banned corporate expenditures which did not “materially affect” the
property of the business. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
reframed the issue as “not whether corporations ‘have’ First
Amendment rights . . . [but] [i]nstead, the question must be whether
[the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant
to protect.”132 The focus on the speech as quintessential political speech
for listeners to hear echoed the rationale the Court relied upon in
Virginia Pharmacy for commercial speech.
The Court struck down the state statute at issue, holding that
“the corporate identity of the speaker” did not “deprive[] this proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to
protection.”133 To arrive at this result, the Court noted that freedom of
speech has “always” been viewed as part of the liberty safeguarded by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “the Court
has not identified a separate source for the right when it has been
asserted by corporations.”134 The Court then included a string cite to the
media corporation cases, including Grosjean, and the NAACP case
regarding the rights of its members to freedom of association, as well as
a footnote to the late nineteenth-century tax case Santa Clara
regarding property rights.135 The Court’s explanation was that “the
press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the
ability to enlighten.”136 Further, the Court pointed to its commercial
speech cases, claiming “[t]hey illustrate that the First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw.”137
Many legal academics, this author included, have criticized the
Court’s decision in Bellotti on grounds related to the Court’s own
corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence.138 But what matters here
132. Id. at 776.
133. Id. at 778.
134. Id. at 780.
135. Id. As one legal commentator noted:
The [Bellotti] majority opinion justified rejection of the Massachusetts argument by
noting that no such distinction had been recognized in prior corporate speech cases,
cases generally involving media, religious, and civil rights entities. One suspects that
the cited cases did not consider the speech rights of purely commercial corporations
because the issue was not raised in those cases, a factual distinction between the instant
case and the cited precedent based on policy considerations and consequences the
Powell opinion choose [sic] to ignore without explanation.
Flynn, supra note 103, at 148.
136. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782.
137. Id. at 783.
138. E.g., PIETY, supra note 128; Blair & Pollman, supra note 4; David Ciepley, Neither
Persons Nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J. L. & CTS. 221 (2013);
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is to notice that when the Court shifted focus away from the corporate
identity of the speaker or spender, it pushed the debate regarding the
appropriateness of corporations as holders of First Amendment rights
into state corporate law and the inner workings of corporations
themselves.
The Bellotti majority opinion brushed aside this problem,
stating:
Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy,
whether their corporation should engage in debate on public issues. Acting through their
power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the
corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own
interests. In addition to intracorporate remedies, minority shareholders generally have
access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements
alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the
personal interests of management.139

This explanation did not sufficiently recognize the weight that
the decision put on corporate law to deal with social and political issues
that it had not developed to address. The Court did not fairly
characterize corporate procedures or the variety of interests at stake.
But Bellotti’s ruling was understood as limited to corporate political
spending on ballot issues, and subsequent cases established limits in
other areas of campaign finance and showed a willingness to find
distinctions between speakers on the basis of corporate status.140
Corporations were required to form separate political action committees
to ensure there was an associational and voluntary nature to political
expenditures.141 This subsequent campaign finance architecture, albeit
uneven and in tension with itself,142 stemmed the impact of Bellotti on
state corporate law and corporate governance for a time.143
Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Express and the Corporation After First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347 (1979).
139. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95.
140. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Federal Election Comm’n v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
141. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (2012))
(defining “contribution” to exclude contributions to “separate segregated fund[s]” (PACs)
established by corporations).
142. Elizabeth Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016).
143. In two cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court impacted state regulation of tender offers.
In a plurality decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Court held that an Illinois
anti-takeover statute concerning interstate tender offers was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. In the aftermath, states adjusted their takeover legislation in an effort to avoid
conflict with federal securities law and apply their provisions only to corporations incorporated in
their state. Subsequently, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), the
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B. The Modern Shift in Corporate Rights Doctrine
The Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
have not only expanded corporate rights, they have also given a quasiconstitutional dimension to state corporate law. Whereas state
corporate law historically served as a means of restraining and
regulating corporations, now it establishes the procedures by which
certain federal rights are exercised.
The Court’s decisions expanding speech and religious liberty
rights of business corporations rely, at least in part, on a view of
corporations as associations and corporate law as establishing
procedures of “democracy” for shareholders. But not all business
corporations have an associational dynamic and existing corporate laws
do not create democratic procedures, nor is that their aim.
This shift in the Court’s corporate rights doctrine has effectively
given constitutional significance to state corporate laws that developed
to be enabling, to focus on the relationship between shareholders and
managers, and to leave to external regulation issues concerning other
corporate participants, the public, and non-economic values. There has
been little reflection on whether these corporate law principles and
arrangements, developed to enable business enterprise, fit with
constitutional rights and values.
To see how this shift has occurred, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, which expanded on Bellotti and dismantled much
of the corporate campaign finance regulation, serves as an analytical
starting point. In Citizens United, a nonprofit political advocacy
organization raised a facial and as-applied challenge to a provision of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that prohibited corporations from
using general treasury funds to make expenditures for electioneering
communications within a certain period of a federal election.144 As a
nonprofit corporation formed for political advocacy, Citizens United
would have fit within an exception to the prohibition but for the fact

Court upheld Indiana’s second-generation statute on preemption and commerce grounds,
emphasizing the state’s legitimate interest in regulating the internal affairs of its corporations.
These cases did not rely on state corporate law for ordering federal corporate rights or settling
disputes amongst corporate participants concerning expressive values; rather they concerned the
validity of state corporate law regulating a governance issue already addressed by federal
regulation. For a discussion of MITE and CTS, see Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as
Micromanagement, 65 BUS. LAW. 789, 789–91 (2010); see also Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and
Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1059–62
(1986).
144. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
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that a small portion of the funds it used for its electioneering
communication was raised from for-profit business corporations.145
Rather than ruling on narrower grounds, such as interpreting a
de minimis safe harbor for expressive nonprofit corporations, the Court
broadly ruled as to all corporations. In a 5-4 decision, the Court struck
down the statutory provision at issue and campaign finance
jurisprudence that had distinguished between individuals and
corporations.146 After Citizens United, corporations have been free to
spend general treasury funds on independent political expenditures.147
The Court’s ruling was based not only on listeners’ interests in
hearing speech, but also on the Court’s characterization of corporations
as “associations of citizens” whose voices were being “muffled,” and its
implication that the First Amendment protection of corporations is
equal to that of individuals.148 The majority opinion’s language suggests
an expressive or dignitary value in the speaker, even in reference to
business corporations: “By taking the right to speak from some and
giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person
or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing,
and respect for the speaker’s voice.”149
Yet, when the Court was asked to consider whether the
government had a compelling interest to regulate in order to protect
dissenting shareholders from being forced to fund corporate political
spending, the Court refused to consider whether all business
corporations truly are associational or democratic in nature. It
expressed concern that this argument could limit the political speech of
media corporations,150 despite the fact that media corporations were not
present in the case and could claim other grounds for protection. And it
stated “[t]here is, furthermore, little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate
democracy.’ ”151

145. Id. at 319, 327–29.
146. Id. at 318, 372.
147. The Court’s reasoning regarding independent expenditures has also led to the creation
of super PACs. See Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644–46 (2012)
(summarizing the rise in super PACs beginning with the 2010 election cycle).
148. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
149. Id. at 341–42.
150. Id. at 361.
151. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978));
see also Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1019, 1021 (2011) (“Citizens United shifted the debate over corporate speech from corporations’
power to distort political debate to the corporate governance processes that authorize this
speech.”).
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Citizens United thus left to “the procedures of corporate
democracy”—state corporate law—the question of whose voice is
expressed through the corporation and the treatment of dissenting
voices. Corporate law has not developed to facilitate the political
expression of corporate participants,152 or to address the question of how
to appropriately handle dissenters from such expression, however, and
so rules that were developed to allow for private ordering of business
ventures have taken on new significance.
This result was notably different from other cases concerning
corporate constitutional rights, which did not give constitutional
dimension to governance rules. From cases addressing the contract and
property rights of corporations to protections from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Court never referred to corporate law as a
mechanism for handling dissent or competing interests. Perhaps this is
because corporate participants are aligned in their interest in the
property of the corporation being protected against government
impairment, taking, or inequitable treatment. Corporate participants
have an economic interest in the labor or capital they have invested,
whether they are employees, directors, or shareholders. Once the
corporation is in the criminal justice system, it receives certain
protections such as against double jeopardy and unreasonable searches
and seizures. Apart from the logistical need to determine who will
assert such right on behalf of the corporation, corporate law plays little
role in sorting the interests of participants regarding corporate defenses
against government prosecution. Citizens United was different because
it concerned rights to political expression, which are not incidental to
the purpose of business corporations and for which there is no reason to
believe that the interests of corporate participants would be aligned in
all types of corporations.
The Court’s recent decision in Hobby Lobby has put even more
pressure on state corporate law to serve as a mechanism for ordering
federal rights. The Hobby Lobby case arose in response to a provision of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 which requires
employers with fifty or more full-time employees to offer health
insurance that meets certain minimum coverage standards, including
preventive care for women.153 The Health Resources and Services
Administration, charged with defining such preventive care standards,
included all FDA-approved contraceptive methods in its guidelines.154
152. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 467 (2008)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Campbell Soup Company does not exist to promote a message . . . .”).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
154. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
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The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided an
exemption for religious employers with religious objections, such as
churches, and an accommodation for other religious nonprofit
organizations.
For-profit business corporations that did not fit into the existing
exemption or accommodation brought suit to challenge the HHS
regulations on the basis of their asserted religious liberty. Two of these
cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court: Conestoga Wood
Specialties and Hobby Lobby.155 Both cases involved a closely held
corporation or corporations with all stock held by family members who
were unanimous in their religious beliefs. Each family asserted that
their religious beliefs would be violated if the corporation in which they
held stock complied with the contraceptive provision of the HHS
regulations.156 As evidence that their religious beliefs were incorporated
into the governance and operations of the corporation, the families
referred to various statements and practices, such as “Vision and
Values Statements” affirming one corporation’s mission to pursue “a
reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects . . . Christian heritage” and
to a board-adopted “Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life.”157
The novel question before the Court was whether the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) applies to business corporations like
those in the case—Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel—and
specifically whether the HHS regulations violated RFRA as applied to
these corporations.158 RFRA prohibits the “Government [from]
substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless that action
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
governmental interest.159 Thus, the important threshold question was
155. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
156. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2765. The Green family members hold their stock
through a trust of which the five family members are trustees and beneficiaries. For a discussion
of the trust aspect of the case, see Gregory Mark, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Personhood, 65
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
157. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764.
158. Given its RFRA ruling, the Supreme Court declined to address claims under the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (“The contraceptive
mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory
question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim raised by Conestoga and the
Hahns.”).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a), (b) (2012) (emphasis added). In Employment Division v. Smith,
the Supreme Court held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability.’ ” 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990). RFRA is a legislative response to Smith, with a stated purpose to “restore the compelling
interest test” as set forth in pre-Smith case law. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1).
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whether business corporations are “persons” capable of the “exercise of
religion” within the meaning of RFRA.
In a 5–4 decision, the Court attributed the religious beliefs of the
shareholders to the business corporations and ruled that the HHS
regulations violated RFRA as applied to the corporations. In the Court’s
words, extending RFRA protection to the corporations “protects the
religious liberty of the humans who own and control these
companies.”160 The majority opinion’s pervasive use of the term “closely
held corporation” suggested a limited ruling, but nothing in the Court’s
logic imposed this limit besides its indication that the shareholders
would have to agree to run the corporation under the same religious
beliefs.161 Similarly, the Court reasoned that for-profit business
corporations are not precluded from exercising religion because, while
“a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money,” they
may support charitable causes, the environment, and employee
interests “[s]o long as [their] owners agree,” and “there is no apparent
reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.”162
Although the theme of shareholder agreement underlies the
Hobby Lobby opinion, the Court actually left the specific qualifications
for RFRA protection quite vague.163 The Court acknowledged that “the
owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to religion,” but
disposed of this concern by noting that “[s]tate corporate law provides a
ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how
a corporation can establish its governing structure.”164
Like Citizens United before it, Hobby Lobby thus looked to state
corporate law as a “ready means” for resolving issues related to federal
rights. It is state corporate law that will determine whether a business
corporation has established a religious identity that can be held at the
entity level and exempt it from complying with generally applicable
federal regulation. The problem is that state corporate law provides no

160. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
161. See id. at 2774 (noting that the case involved closely held corporations, not public
corporations and it is “unlikely” that such “corporate giants” would “often assert RFRA claims”
and “the idea that unrelated shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of
stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems
improbable”).
162. Id. at 2771.
163. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149, 153–67 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (discussing
ambiguities and weaknesses in the Court’s analysis regarding its theory of the corporation as a
rights holder, corporate purpose, “closely held” status, and using state corporate law to resolve
disputes).
164. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
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such simple answer or means of bearing the pressure to reconcile
diverse religious, social, and political values and beliefs.165
III. THE NEW FEDERAL-STATE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
This Part attempts to deepen the broader observation of the
changed federal-state interplay. It looks at the mismatch between state
corporate law and the new corporate rights doctrine to show the
difficulties with relying on state corporate law to resolve disputes
regarding the expression of non-economic interests. In particular, this
Part identifies the following areas of incongruence: (1) assumptions that
business corporations are “associations” that provide for effective
“corporate democracy”; (2) oversights concerning the fit of corporate law
principles such as fiduciary duties; and (3) misunderstandings about
corporate law participants.
These areas of mismatch are important because they put
pressure on state corporate law to adapt. Although business
corporations involve natural persons with religious, social, and political
values and beliefs, state corporate law has developed without a focus on
ordering or furthering these goals.166 And in fact it has developed to rely
on external law to do exactly what Hobby Lobby failed to do—protect
corporate participants and stakeholders who are not protected through
state corporate law. Furthermore, state corporate law by its nature
165. The fact that corporate law provides no ready means of resolving the religious identity
of a corporation is exemplified by the variety of interpretations and recommendations offered by
corporate law professors in response to HHS’s request for public comment on defining eligible
organizations post-Hobby Lobby. See Lyman Johnson et al., Comments on the HHS’ Flawed PostHobby Lobby Rules (UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 14-18, 2014), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2512860 [https://perma.cc/PY8W-F8Z8]; Robert P. Bartlett III et al., Comment on the
Definition of “Eligible Organization” (Oct. 8, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507305
[https://perma.cc/R23C-Y259] (authored by U.C. Berkeley Corporate Law Professors); Katherine
Franke et al., Comment on the Definition of “Eligible Organization” (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/prpcp_comments_on
_proposed_regs_corp_law_profs_for_submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZZT-FFKQ] (composed by
the Columbia Conscience Project and Corporate Law Professors).
166. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 62 (1996) (“Investor-owned firms
have the important advantage that their owners generally share a single well-defined objective: to
maximize the net present value of the firm’s earnings.”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and
Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 961 (1984) (stating that the pursuit of ends other
than profit maximization is “especially disturbing because profit maximization is the only goal for
which we can at least theoretically posit shareholder unanimity.”); see also, e.g., eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010):
The corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at
least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their
investment . . . . Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, . . . directors are bound by
the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.
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includes the potential for variation and lack of uniformity across the
states, which could heighten the impact of the issues that this Part
identifies.
To the extent that state corporate law is not equipped to deal
with the issues raised by granting political and religious rights to
corporations, or to the extent that state corporate law does not adapt in
coming years or does not do so uniformly, federal regulation may play
an increasingly important role in corporate governance. For example,
after Citizens United the Securities and Exchange Commission
considered mandating public company disclosure of political
spending.167 After Hobby Lobby, the Departments of Labor, Treasury,
and Health promulgated a rule defining “closely held” corporations for
purposes of implementing the decision.168
This observation contributes a somewhat different critique from
past discussions of the federal-state interplay in corporate governance.
From time to time, Congress has stepped in during periods of perceived
corporate law failings with regulation aimed at improving investor
protection, accountability to shareholders, and market integrity.169
After stock market crashes and corporate scandals, federal regulation
has added an overlay on state corporate law to require, for instance,
mandatory disclosures, certifications, board committees and director
independence, and nonbinding shareholder votes.170 Scholars have
critiqued this federal regulation of corporate law as impinging on the
longstanding respect for states to oversee the corporations they create,
to promote the relationships in the corporations they charter, and to
function as sites of experimentation to find solutions to the regulatory
problems that arise in corporate law.171 Such scholars have disputed the
167. Petitions to the SEC on this topic, File No. 4-637, are available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4-637.shtml [https://perma.cc/4N6Q-WP2E]. See also
Michael Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 593, 599–601 (2014) (discussing the agency’s consideration of the issue). After
significant public debate and agency consideration, Congress blocked the SEC from using funds to
mandate disclosure of corporate political disclosure. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016,
H. R. 2029, Title VII § 707 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/2029/text [https://perma.cc/CP9S-FE6E].
168. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg.
41,317 (Jul. 14, 2015).
169. See supra notes 80–86.
170. The landmark legislation for these measures includes the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act. See supra note
86; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26, 26–27
(2013).
171. Bainbridge, supra note 170, at 30–31 (quoting Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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“race to the bottom” theory that hypothesized states compete for
incorporations by adopting management-friendly corporate law and
instead they have suggested that there is a “race to the top” in which
efficient solutions to corporate law win out over time.172 They have
claimed that corporate governance is best left to the states because
“competitive federalism” provides a check on excessive regulation and
promotes economic freedom to pursue wealth.173
But the observation offered here is not about the previous
critiques or the increasing federalization of corporate law generally. In
the past, the values and goals underlying the federal regulation of
corporate governance have been at least largely consistent with existing
corporate law, aimed at enhancing economic welfare and reducing harm
to investors. The debate centered on whether regulation towards these
ends is best achieved by federal or state governments. The observation
here is instead aimed at showing that recent Supreme Court cases have
created a new dynamic between federal rights and corporate law, an
incongruence or mismatch that contributes to a need for legal change,
whether at the state or federal level, and a better understanding of the
expanded role of corporate governance rules for business corporations.
A. Business “Associations” and “Procedures of Corporate Democracy”
Despite the Court’s characterization of corporations as
“associations of citizens” in Citizens United,174 not all corporations are
associational in nature.175 Associations “produce connections, networks,
and norms that make widespread social cooperation possible.”176 Many
172. Bainbridge, supra note 170, at 30; see also Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525–27 (2001); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226–27 (1985).
173. Bainbridge, supra note 170, at 31.
174. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349, 354 (2010).
175. A longstanding debate, beyond the scope of this Article, concerns the ontology of social
groups and corporations. See, e.g., Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism About
Corporate Rights, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 345 (Micah Schwartzman et al.
eds., 2016).
176. James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 477
(2015) (discussing democratic theories of association); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves
and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1239–40 (1994);
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1570–71. Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote of an association as individuals combining for some purpose and he envisioned
a certain level of involvement, in which individuals “become acquainted with each other, and their
zeal increased by their number.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 219 (Bantam
Classics 2000); see also RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION 19–25 (2015) (discussing the characteristics of the Tocquevillian association and
noting that “modern scholars have studied the role of associations in society, and their scholarship
has generally supported and deepened Tocqueville’s insights and conjectures”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661115

2016]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING CORPORATE LAW

673

business corporations do not fit the paradigm of a voluntary association
or community, envisioned as a site in which individuals feel a sense of
connection or identification.177 As legal scholar Ernst Freund observed
in 1897, we can see in some corporations “rather an aggregation of
capital than an association of persons.”178
Drawing lines between different kinds of corporations is
undoubtedly difficult,179 but that difficulty should not cloud judgment
about the fact that many business corporations do not function like
social associations that implicate First Amendment values. As James
Nelson put it in recent work on the freedom of association, there may
be tough cases at the margins, but “one might be less concerned about
passing judgment on Wal-Mart or the NAACP.”180
Several factors contribute to the lack of an associational dynamic
in many business corporations. For example, many corporations have
dispersed, passive investors who are diversified and rationally
apathetic to involvement in the corporation.181 In recent decades, many
investors hold stock through other institutions.182 This adds a layer of
management, which “separates ownership from ownership,” and means
that the beneficial owners of corporate stock are often completely
uninvolved in the corporation and might even be unaware of their stock
ownership.183 Furthermore, the institutional investors are often short177. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS 14–18 (2002) (discussing the concept of
community and nondetached roles and noting that role distance is often engendered in
organizations with a large size, formal and hierarchical structure); Nelson, supra note 176, at 493–
95 (discussing the connection between “personhood” and associations); Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 877 (2005) (noting that
“[commercial] associations are not structured in such a way to function well as sites for the
realization of freedom of speech values”).
178. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 60 (1897), quoted in MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 100 (1992).
179. Pollman, supra note 142; see also Larry Alexander, What Is Freedom of Association, and
What Is Its Denial?, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2008) (arguing it is impossible to distinguish
between different kinds of associations); John Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1435, 1450–54 (2012) (contending there is no principled basis for distinguishing commercial
businesses from expressive associations).
180. Nelson, supra note 176, at 469.
181. For the seminal work on this point, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1–7 (1932); see also MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
182. Strine & Walter, supra note 18, at 17 n.74:
Corporations have perpetual existence, are not owned by anyone (stockholders own
shares with certain legal rights, not pieces of the corporation), and have a separate legal
existence from the stockholders, managers, and creditors . . . . Indeed, it is a stretch to
say the modern corporation is an association of individuals, given that most corporate
stock is held by institutional investors.
183. Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1828 (2011) (“Individual long-term capital holders no longer
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term holders.184 In public corporations, shareholders are a rapidly
changing group.185 Even in private corporations, shareholders have
limited rights to participate meaningfully in the corporation, and the
fiduciary duties of managers and controlling shareholders focus
attention on the interest of overall share value.186
In light of the above, shareholders often value the corporations
in which they invest exclusively for the potential economic return they
might provide and are uninvolved in their operation. Using the
terminology of Meir Dan-Cohen, shareholders have detached roles.187
This detachment is facilitated by the centralized, hierarchical structure
of business corporations. The board of directors manages the affairs of
the corporation and delegates the execution of day-to-day operations to
corporate officers and other employees.188 Decisionmaking rules are

hold shares of corporations directly; the direct holders of shares predominantly are institutional
investors.”); see Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from
Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879 (2010) (noting that as of 2009, institutional investors
owned fifty percent of total U.S. equities); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance
of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447–51 (1991) (discussing the rise of
institutional investors).
184. Rodrigues, supra note 183, at 1823 (“[T]he immediate shareholders of the vast majority
of publicly traded corporations have short-term investment horizons that can be measured in
months, or even days.”).
185. See generally Blair & Pollman, supra note 4.
186. See Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 64–65, 78–79
(2014) (discussing the limited participation and connection of many shareholders to corporations);
Nelson, supra note 176, at 499 (discussing how shareholders in private corporations typically
“follow the same financially focused pattern” and do not develop associational ties); Smith, supra
note 67, at 310 (discussing fiduciary duties in private corporations and the development of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm).
187. MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS 14–18 (2002).
188. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2010) (“All
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of
the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors . . . .”); WILLIAM A. KLEIN,
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 137 (11th ed.
2010) (“Legally, the officers (and other employees) of the corporation are agents of the corporation
whose authority comes from a delegation by the board.”); see also STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, at x (2008):
The public corporation is a large, complex, and geographically dispersed entity with
multiple stakeholders. Participatory democracy would be untenable in such an
organization. We’re dealing with vast numbers of people with radically asymmetric
information and fundamentally competing interests. Under such conditions, collective
action problems will prove intractable, even if the mechanics of allowing thousands of
stakeholders to meaningfully participate in decision making could be solved. Instead, it
will be more efficient for decision-making authority to be assigned to some central
person or group.
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often based on a majority of the board or left to individuals filling the
ranks of the corporate management structure.189
Not only are many business corporations not associational in
nature; the “procedures of corporate democracy” are not an effective tool
for dissenting shareholders as the Court suggested in Citizens United.
As a preliminary matter, corporations are not democracies.190 According
to political theorist Robert Dahl, democracy entails effective
participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of
the agenda, and inclusion.191 Corporate governance does not meet these
standards. Not all corporate participants have voting rights, and those
who do have unequal votes.192 Corporations are, in Dahl’s words,
“typically undemocratic; sometimes, indeed, they are virtually
managerial despotisms.”193 Another way to describe the contemporary
corporate governance process is “plutocratic,” with voting proportional
to the amount of investment.194 Because of this dynamic, the political
189. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 8 (1977) (noting that over time corporate hierarchies have proven to have “a
permanence beyond that of any individual or group of individuals who worked in them”).
190. See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1389–90 (2006) (arguing that “comparisons between the corporate and
civic polities, while intellectually tempting, ultimately falter because participation in a corporation
fundamentally differs from participation in a nation”); Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze
of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
735, 735 (2003) (“According to a common American myth, shareholders govern corporations
through a process of corporate democracy. Even the Supreme Court labors under this
misconception.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An
Organizational Failure Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1004 (1998) (“Public corporations are
characterized not by participatory democracy, but by hierarchies in which decisions are made on
an authoritarian basis.”); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The End of Corporate Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 703, 725 (2009) (“[S]hareholder democracy [became] associated not with shareholder
participation but with the investors’ twin rights of voice and exit. But . . . in the [late] twentieth
century, the Delaware courts . . . render[ed] even this limited set of rights ineffective, to solidify
management’s absolute power, and to shield it from liability.”).
191. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 37–39, 95 (1998).
192. In explaining why these criteria for political equality are necessary for a democratic
process, Dahl asked rhetorically:
[L]et’s assume that votes are assigned a weight in proportion to the amount of property
a member owns, and members possess greatly differing amounts of property. If we
believe that all the members are equally well qualified to participate in the association’s
decisions, why should the votes of some be counted for more than the votes of others?
Id. at 39. Furthermore, with respect to inclusion, Dahl pointed out that the interests of those
deprived a voice in governance “will not be adequately protected and advanced by those who
govern.” Id. at 77.
193. Id. at 182. Dahl took this point a step further and argued that “[u]nequal ownership and
control of major economic enterprises in turn contribute massively to the inequality in political
resources . . . and thus to extensive violations of political equality among democratic citizens.” Id.
194. Colleen A. Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting
Rights and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA 66, 67 (Kenneth
Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004). For a discussion of historical patterns of shareholder voting
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power of managers or shareholders with large blocks of stock is
magnified.195
Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, when shareholders
invest in business corporations they are not generally doing so for
political purposes. They do not have ready means for controlling
corporate political spending and they cannot easily obtain relief if they
dissent with the corporations’ choices in that regard.196
Shareholders elect the board of directors, but the shareholder
franchise is not a device to aggregate the political, social, or religious
values of shareholders, nor is it often a deliberative or associational
process.197 As Professors Robert Thompson and Paul Edelman aptly
observed, “[v]oting plays a limited role in corporate decisionmaking,
much more limited than in the public sphere.”198 Furthermore, “[t]his
reality should push any discussion of corporate voting away from a focus
on democratic theory and legitimacy, which would imply voting is a way
to aggregate the preferences of the rightful claimants as to who should
run a corporation (or the country), and more toward a framework based
on information theory, which treats voting as a means of error
correction for decisions.”199

rules, see Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights:
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948 (2014).
195. Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 258 (1981).
196. Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in
Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 56 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/
citizens-not-united-the-lack-of-stockholder-voluntariness-in-corporate-political-speech
[https://perma.cc/2435-YZ7U]. For a discussion of the harm to individuals when corporations
express points of view they do not wish to support, see LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 144–55 (1987); see
also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 839 (2005).
197. HANSMANN, supra note 166, at 11, 288–89 (noting that voting “is not to provide a means
for conveying the patrons’ preferences to the firm’s management, but rather to make it more
difficult for the firm to exploit these patrons as a class . . . [t]o give the electorate some crude
protection from gross opportunism on the part of those in power”); see also Blasius Indus., Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting the stockholder right to vote has long been
viewed “as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance” but it legitimates the directors’ exercise
of power over property they do not own). Historically, in some corporations shareholder voting had
more associational or democratic characteristics such as each shareholder having one vote, or a
graduated vote by stock ownership, and it was done in person, but these rules changed by the midnineteenth century “as the economic purpose and function of the corporation evolved.” Donald J.
Smythe, Shareholder Democracy and the Economic Purpose of the Corporation, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2006); see also Dunlavy, supra note 194, at 66–68; Samuel Williston, History
of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 149, 156–58 (1888).
198. Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130
(2009).
199. Id.
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Directors can be elected by a plurality vote in which
shareholders do not have access to the nomination process or proxy.200
Responsibility for management is vested in the board of directors, and
in practice many decisions are delegated to executives, who will make
political expenditures from the corporate funds without a shareholder
vote.201 Under state corporate law, corporate political spending is an
ordinary business decision, which receives the protection of the
business judgment rule.202 Derivative actions are highly unlikely to
provide relief to dissenting shareholders because, unless the
shareholder can make a case for fraud or self-dealing, they are unlikely
to show demand futility and overcome the business judgment rule.203
Shareholder proposals, allowed in public corporations, are nonbinding
unless aimed at amending the bylaws, which requires shareholders to
overcome collective action hurdles and achieve a majority vote. In sum,
existing corporate law rules give the management the voice in the
corporation for ordinary business decisions including corporate political
spending and dissenting shareholders are unlikely to have their
concerns meaningfully addressed.
Moreover, shareholders lack information on corporate political
expenditures and a large number of investors own stock indirectly
through mutual funds, 401(k) accounts, or other pension or retirement
plans.204 As noted, this indirect type of stock ownership through
institutional investors means that many Americans do not even know
in which corporations their money is invested, and, even if they did,
they would not be able to sell the stock of a particular corporation.205
Fundamentally there is a mismatch between the Court’s
characterization of corporations in its modern rights doctrine and the
reality of corporations and corporate law. The implication is that either
corporate rights doctrine or corporate law should change.

200. Id. at 138 (“Typically there is only one slate of nominees, presented by the board itself,
and directors can be elected by a simple plurality.”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware:
Why Congress Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 758 (2013)
(discussing shareholder proxy access).
201. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 843–47 (2005) (“Shareholders do not necessarily have the power to order directors to follow
any particular course of action. Rather, the powers of shareholders are limited to what corporate
statutes specify and . . . the company’s constitutional documents.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas
Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory
and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 363 (2015).
202. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 83.
203. Pollman, supra note 196, at 56.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also Strine & Walter, supra note 201, at 370.
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As I have argued with Margaret Blair, the Court’s modern
corporate rights doctrine is flawed because it has extended its
derivative rights logic beyond what is supported by fact—not all
corporations can be fairly characterized as associations of persons from
whom rights can or should be derived.206 For example, Citizens United
represents an identifiable group of natural persons who associated for
political purposes and the entity could logically be accorded a derivative
right to protect such persons. But other corporations do not represent
such an association and the purpose of the First Amendment was not
served by the Court’s broad ruling as to all corporations.207
Similarly, Larry Ribstein observed that “the dispersed, passive,
and anonymous shareholders that corporate-governance-based
regulation purports to protect are unlikely to have much expressive
interest at stake in corporate activities.”208 He also recognized the
implication that something must change, noting that if Citizens
United’s rationale were accepted, that business corporations are a
vehicle for the expressive rights of shareholders, then it would justify
changes such as subjecting decisions about corporate political spending
to shareholder approval measures.209 Victor Brudney had foreseen this
earlier, after Bellotti, arguing that the First Amendment does not
inhibit the government from determining that corporate decisions
should be made by officers or directors only after consulting
shareholders, or even by supermajority or unanimous vote of
shareholders.210

206. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1733:
The derivative nature of rights for corporations requires the Court to pay attention to
distinctions, to explicitly acknowledge that, for some purposes, some corporations can
usefully and functionally be regarded as aggregates of their members from whom rights
could be derived, while other corporations serve other purposes, and cannot be regarded
as representing any particular natural person or group of natural persons.
207. Id.; see also ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 70 (2014) (“Most corporations are not formed for the purpose of engaging in First
Amendment activities. Ordinary commercial corporations are not expressive associations, and for
this reason they may not assert the First Amendment rights of persons who make up ordinary
commercial corporations.”).
208. Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1019, 1022 (2011). Ribstein also noted that it is not clear why shareholders would be the only
constituency that matters for expressive purposes. Id. at 1038.
209. Id. at 1041–44. In this new federal-state dynamic, it becomes less clear what sort of
regulation might pass scrutiny, however. In Citizens United, the Court suggested that a corporate
governance regulation would be permitted, but a regulatory mechanism “based on speech,
contravenes the First Amendment.” 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010); see also Ribstein, supra note 208, at
1043–44 (explaining that “in determining the constitutionality of governance regulation, courts
must weigh protection of shareholder expression against frustrating corporate speech generally
and the expression rights of particular shareholders and stakeholders”).
210. Brudney, supra note 195, at 238, 256.
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The need for a change in corporate law to deal with corporate
political spending stems from the different values at stake in that
context compared with other business decisions. For example, most
business decisions made by the board of directors and managers focus
on business operations and strategy that do not directly concern social,
political, or religious values. Corporate law rules for these kinds of
ordinary business decisions give authority and deference to the board
of directors to manage the affairs of the corporation, promoting efficient
passive investment and the pursuit of economic welfare.
By contrast, the closest analogy to corporate political spending
is corporate charitable donations, a longstanding thorny issue for
corporate law because of concerns that corporate managers can sacrifice
profits for social issues that not all shareholders or corporate
participants agree upon. Scholars have justified corporate law’s
treatment of charitable donations as ordinary business decisions on the
basis that such treatment tempers profit-seeking obligations or
pressures by giving corporate managers discretion to comply with social
and moral norms.211 The structure of large corporations insulates
dispersed shareholders from social or moral pressures to act as owners
in a community and creates collective action obstacles for the
corporation to act in a socially desirable way.212 According to this view,
giving corporate managers the discretion to make corporate charitable
donations optimizes corporate conduct.
Corporate political spending has not been similarly defended,
however. Although some have argued that corporate political spending
maximizes value for shareholders, it is not also discussed in terms of
complying with social or moral obligations as are corporate charitable
donations. Furthermore, corporate political activity raises additional
concerns of compelled speech and impact on other social values such as
electoral integrity.213

211. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
745 (2005).
212. Id. at 739–40 (noting that even if corporate charitable donations are agency costs
generated by the failure of corporate managers to act as loyal agents, “their exercises of profitsacrificing discretion will generally still make corporate conduct more socially desirable”); id. at
798 (“Separating ownership from management of corporate operations also means the ownershareholders do not participate in the sort of social and moral processes that give ordinary business
owners affirmative desires to behave in socially desirable ways when the law and profit motives
are insufficient to do so.”).
213. See generally POST, supra note 207, at 3–5 (discussing the value of electoral integrity
imperiled by Citizens United); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 111–14 (discussing the
expressive significance to shareholders of decisions about corporate political spending); Sachs,
Unions, supra note 15, at 844 (arguing for political opt-out rights for corporate political spending).
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B. Fiduciary Duties and Minorities
In addition to the failings of the Court’s characterization of
corporations as “associations of citizens” with “procedures of corporate
democracy,” other knotty issues also arise from the Court’s reliance on
the mechanisms of state corporate law without examination of the
details to understand the fit and the implications.
One example concerns fiduciary duties and governance in
business corporations in which the participants are conflicted about
whether it should be run in accordance with religious values or goals.
As we saw above, in Hobby Lobby the Court determined that a business
corporation can pursue religious objectives at the expense of profits “[s]o
long as its owners agree.”214 Later in the opinion, the Court
acknowledged that “the owners of a company might well have a dispute
relating to religion,” but disposed of this concern by noting that “[s]tate
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for
example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing
structure.”215 The Court’s opinion, however, did not delineate the
separate roles of the shareholders and the board, nor did it square its
reasoning in recognizing RFRA standing—to protect those who “own
and control” the corporations—with the mechanics and structure
created by corporate law.
Under state corporate law, for example, the shareholders and
the board of directors have legally distinct roles and obligations.
Shareholders do not have the authority to direct the business and
affairs for the corporation. The board acts for the corporation, in its
capacity as a collective body, or through delegation of authority to
officers and other individuals.216
One of the bedrock principles of corporate law regarding this
division in roles and obligations is that corporate directors and
managers are fiduciaries.217 Fiduciary principles originated in equity.218

214. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
215. Id. at 2775.
216. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 505 (2014) (“The board of directors controls the corporate business and
authorizes the corporation’s executive agents to enter into contracts and new business
ventures . . . . Thus, the business and affairs of the corporation are managed by and under the
direction of its board.”).
217. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983); D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002).
218. DeMott, supra note 217, at 880.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661115

2016]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING CORPORATE LAW

681

Scholars have defined the fiduciary relationship in myriad ways,219 and
the problems it seeks to address,220 but it is well established as one of
the “core corporate law protections of capital.”221
Hobby Lobby does not consider whether it is possible to reconcile
fiduciary duty doctrine with a business corporation that exercises
religion through those who “own and control” the corporation. In the
factual situation of Hobby Lobby, the shareholders were unanimous in
their religious beliefs and they actively managed the corporations
involved in the case. There was therefore no one to disagree or raise a
claim regarding fiduciary duties.222 But the Court did not clearly limit
219. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 217, at 809 (identifying “[t]he two central characteristics of
fiduciary relations” as “the substitution function and the delegation of power”); Smith, supra note
217, at 1402 (“[F]iduciary relationships form when one party (the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of
another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource
belonging to the beneficiary.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 432 (1993) (characterizing the fiduciary relationship as contractual
with “high costs of specification and monitoring” and fiduciary duties as default rules to reduce
costs associated with incomplete contracts); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 539, 540 (1949) (defining a fiduciary as “a person who undertakes to act in the interest of
another person”).
220. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 217, at 915 (“Described instrumentally, the fiduciary
obligation is a device that enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety
of reasons, one person’s discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person’s
relationship with another.”); Frankel, supra note 217, at 811 (arguing that the need for fiduciary
law is to protect the “entrustor” from “abuse of power”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis
of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (asserting that “fiduciary duties should
properly be seen as a method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts”); Smith, supra note 217, at
1424, 1497 (“The role of fiduciary duty is to curb such self-interested behavior in the absence of
complete specification of the fiduciary’s obligations.”); Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings
of Delaware’s Modern Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 3, 3
(2012) (arguing that fiduciary duties in the corporate context “support economic prosperity by
establishing a liability framework to incentivize corporate directors and managers to engage in
value-maximizing behavior” and “to serve as the moral pulse of our society as we define and set
expectations for business relationships”).
221. William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 897 (1997); see
also DeMott, supra note 217, at 881 (“Invested by corporation statutes with discretionary authority
to manage or supervise the management of the corporation’s business, directors are bound by
fiduciary principles.”). Courts developed the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and managers
as a matter of common law. Smith, supra note 67, at 289. Some corporation statutes have evolved
to include fiduciary duties. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.31 (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N,
amended 2010) (providing standards of conduct and liability for directors).
222. Arguably the unanimity of the shareholders and their role in management also
supported a claim that the conduct of the corporation was in fact religiously motivated, an issue
that would not be as clear where the will of only the majority of shareholders is expressed and not
others who have conflicting interests and values. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas,
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 232 (1994) (noting that
RFRA’s “legislative history is relatively clear . . . that the bill would protect conduct that was
religiously ‘motivated’ ”); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 66 (2013) (“[T]he key to determining whether a
particular action is a religious exercise is determining whether religious belief motivates the act.”).
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its ruling to facts in which the shareholders are unanimous in their
beliefs and all of the shareholders are involved in management of the
corporation. Where this is not the case, and corporate constituents are
in disagreement, exercising religion through the business corporation
may conflict with fiduciary duties.223 Can a business corporation
promote or exercise the religion of a majority of the directors or
shareholders where such actions do not promote the value of the
corporation for all of its shareholders?224 The answer is unclear or at
least subject to significant debate. What is evident is that corporate law
does not provide the “ready means” for resolving disputes regarding
religious interests that the Court proclaimed.
To start, although it is axiomatic that corporate directors and
managers are fiduciaries, the question of to whom they owe their
fiduciary duties is a matter of longstanding controversy.225 To many, the
answer depends on one’s view or theory of the corporation.226 Some
scholars maintain that corporate directors and managers owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders,227 while others assert that they owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation itself.228 According to some, the task of sorting
223. See DeMott, supra note 217, at 918 (“[I]f the corporation owes a fiduciary obligation to
each shareholder individually, does the majoritarian norm for shareholder decision-making apply
to transactions that would otherwise breach the corporation’s fiduciary obligation? Or is the assent
of each individual shareholder necessary?”).
224. In many instances, running a corporation in accordance with religious values might not
be in conflict with promoting the value of the corporation, or might at least be justified under the
business judgment rule, but it is possible that religious and economic goals could conflict. See Mark
Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 70, 76–82 (2013) (discussing business models of religious for-profit corporations),
http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/12/99CLRO70-November.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TL3-9JP4].
Resolving this potential conflict between social or religious goals and economic goals is indeed part
of the catalyst for new forms of social enterprise such as benefit corporations. J. Haskell Murray,
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
345, 346 (2014); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 235, 242 (2014).
225. Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 493 (2012)
(“[L]egally speaking, there is deep uncertainty as to precisely which parties are the beneficiaries
of directors’ fiduciary duties.”).
226. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2012) (“Different theories of the firm diverge sharply as to which parties
directors should seek to benefit.”); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 536 (2015) (discussing how shareholder primacy theory identifies
fiduciary duties as being owed to shareholders, team production theory identifies fiduciary duties
as being owed to the corporation, and corporate law expresses ambivalence).
227. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey, supra note 220, at 25; Julian
Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 911.
228. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1160–61 (1932); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 298 (1999).
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out with particularity which duties are owed to whom “is doomed to
fail.”229 Further, even a leading corporate jurist has acknowledged the
ambiguity underlying the application of fiduciary law in corporate
law.230
Notwithstanding this complexity and debate, we can observe
that Hobby Lobby’s focus on protecting the religious liberty of those
“who own and control” the business corporation might not accord easily
with fiduciary duty doctrine. Courts commonly identify the
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties as “the corporation and its
shareholders.”231 One recent Delaware opinion explained this phrasing
in terms of shareholder wealth:
“It is, of course, accepted that a corporation may take steps, such as giving charitable
contributions or paying higher wages, that do not maximize profits currently. They may
do so, however, because such activities are rationalized as producing greater profits over
the long-term.” Decisions of this nature benefit the corporation as a whole, and by
increasing the value of the corporation, the directors increase the share of value available
for the residual claimants. Judicial opinions therefore often refer to directors owing
fiduciary duties “to the corporation and its shareholders.” This formulation captures the
foundational relationship in which directors owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate
benefit of the entity’s residual claimants. Nevertheless, “stockholders’ best interest must
always, within legal limits, be the end.232

229. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309,
1316 (2008).
230. Allen, supra note 221, at 894. Legal commentators have also noted the ambiguity in this
area of law. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2008) (arguing that corporate law is “ambivalent” regarding major issues
such as the intended beneficiaries of corporate production); DeMott, supra note 217, at 916 (“[A]n
institutional fact lending considerable importance to litigation over issues of fiduciary obligation
in the United States is the relative absence of clear, statutory, prophylactic rules regulating the
use of powers by corporate directors and controlling shareholders.”); Andrew S. Gold, Theories of
the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087, 1087, 1096 (2012) (discussing
“judicial uncertainty regarding the correct theory of the firm” and “the indeterminacy of fiduciary
beneficiaries”).
231. See, e.g., Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)
(explaining that “the directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its stockholders”); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing their duties the
directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation and its
shareholders.”); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“In
discharging this function, the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation
and its shareholders[.]”); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many
Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW.
761, 764 n.8 (2008) (noting the Delaware Supreme Court “sometimes articulates directors’
fiduciary duties as owed to ‘the corporation’ and sometimes articulates the duties as owed to ‘the
corporation and its shareholders.’ ”). Scholars disagree regarding whether this language suggests
an equivalence between the corporation and its shareholders. See Velasco, supra note 227, at
n.154.
232. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citations omitted).
The court also explained:
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Moreover, courts have emphasized that fiduciary duties are owed to all
of the shareholders, not simply those who own and control the
corporation.233 This concept originated in cases involving disputes
among majority and minority shareholders in closely held
corporations.234
This concept evolved into the notion that controlling
shareholders themselves owe fiduciary duties.235 While corporate law
allows for customizing governance rules and provides a majority
decisionmaking norm in many instances, the protection of minority
shareholders is also a principle of corporate law.236 Controlling
shareholders are constrained to act equitably.237 Many states have
developed a doctrine of shareholder oppression in closely held
In terms of the standard of conduct, the duty of loyalty therefore mandates that
directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the
providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in which the
residual claimants have locked in their investment. When deciding whether to pursue
a strategic alternative that would end or fundamentally alter the stockholders’ ongoing
investment in the corporation, the loyalty-based standard of conduct requires that the
alternative yield value exceeding what the corporation otherwise would generate for
stockholders over the long-term.
Id. at 37.
233. See Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *10 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 27, 1987):
Much of the plaintiffs’ argument . . . seems premised on an assumption that a right to
designate a majority of the board involves legally the right to control the board’s action
and thus the corporation. However, so long as the law demands of directors, as I believe
it does, fidelity to the corporation and all of its shareholders and does not recognize a
special duty on the part of directors elected by a special class to the class electing them,
such a premise must be regarded as legally incorrect.
Comm. on Corp. Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the Controlled Corporation,
45 BUS. LAW. 429, 430 (1989) (“All directors have the same duties to the corporation and to all of
its shareholders.”); see also In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 38 (“The duty to act for the ultimate benefit of
stockholders does not require that directors fulfill the wishes of a particular subset of the
stockholder base.”).
234. Smith, supra note 67, at 305–22 (arguing the shareholder primacy norm was first used
to resolve disputes among shareholders in closely held corporations and this use evolved into the
modern doctrine of minority oppression).
235. Id.
236. See Smith, supra note 217, at 1459:
Enforcing this [fiduciary] obligation is complicated in closely held corporations, where
the norm of majority rule bumps up against the prohibition of self-interested behavior.
Majority shareholders in closely held corporations are like partners in a partnership in
the sense that their actions are necessarily self-interested. In this setting, whether the
actions of a majority shareholder constitute a wrong toward the minority shareholders
(often) depends on vague concepts of fairness.
237. See, e.g., 12B FLETCHER CYC. CORP. §§ 5810–11 (2014) (outlining the duties of majority
shareholders); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958)
(noting the rules of corporate law “were and still are directed primarily toward the protection of
the property interests of minority stockholders”); Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and
Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 124 (2003) (arguing that corporate law is “a device to ensure that
minorities will be treated fairly”).
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corporations because the lack of a public market leaves minority
shareholders particularly vulnerable to the majority’s actions.238 In
sum, regardless of whether the beneficiary is expressed as “the
corporation and its shareholders,” the “corporation,” or the
“shareholders,” there may be minority shareholders, and perhaps other
constituents, to whom fiduciary duties are owed.239 This case law has
roots in the closely held context, like Hobby Lobby, in that the corporate
stock is privately held by a small number of shareholders.
Notably, the vast bulk of the corporate fiduciary duty
scholarship and case law on these points considers conflicts that are
economic in nature.240 For example, minority oppression cases have
typically involved situations in which the majority used its power to
obtain economic advantage or disproportionate benefit at the minority’s
expense, or to frustrate the reasonable expectations of the minority
regarding other economic matters such as dividends or employment.241
Some legal commentators might assert that this shows that modern
rights doctrine does not implicate fiduciary duty analysis.242
But perhaps this disconnect is exactly the point. The difficult fit
between the religious values at stake in Hobby Lobby and the corporate
case law dealing with fiduciary duties and conflicts between
238. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1209 (2009) (“The potential
for minority shareholder oppression should be understood, therefore, as an inherent structural
characteristic of the close corporation form.”). For a discussion of different approaches to the
shareholder oppression doctrine, see Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close
Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749 (2000).
239. For a notable recent example involving a closely held corporation in which the
founders/majority shareholders sought to run the corporation according to non-economic values,
see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). The Delaware
Chancery Court ruled:
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the . . . directors are bound by the fiduciary
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . . Thus, I
cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly
seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the
benefit of its stockholders . . . . If [the majority stockholders] were the only stockholders
affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to object. [The minority
stockholder], however, holds a significant stake . . . and [the majority stockholders’]
actions affect others besides themselves.
Id.
240. See generally 2 F.H. O’NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 2003) (discussing the relevant scholarship and case law).
241. Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 17–18 (2014).
242. In an essay about Hobby Lobby, Professor Stephen Bainbridge noted the nature of the
disputes in the minority oppression jurisprudence and asked: “Does anyone really see potential
shareholder disputes over expressions of corporate religious identity as being particularly
susceptible to analysis in these terms?” Id.
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shareholders shows the weight that Hobby Lobby has put on corporate
law to resolve problems of a type that it has not to date developed to
address. It is at least possible that federal law according religious
liberty protections to corporations on the basis of protecting controlling
shareholders conflicts with state corporate law principles that require
those controlling shareholders and corporate managers to act in the
interests of the corporation and all of its shareholders.243
Another related point of corporate law that proves controversial
is whether the governing documents of a corporation could alter or
eliminate fiduciary duties and minority protections. The Hobby Lobby
Court suggested that disputes could be settled in the corporation’s
governance structure, but whether fiduciary duties can be contracted
around or whether they are inherent in the corporate form is the subject
of significant dispute.244 As a descriptive matter, courts have suggested
that they will give effect to a customized governance provision except
where it conflicts with public policy or corporate law.245 Case law has
243. See Strine, supra note 100, at 145–46, 154–55 (explaining that although corporate
founders or managers may have unique social or religious values which they wish to promote,
“pursuing a controversial political or moral agenda is intrinsically problematic” when the
corporation has taken money from other investors). One legal commentator has recently suggested
that fiduciary duties are implicated by corporate religious exercise. Marc A. Greendorfer, Blurring
Lines Between Churches and Secular Corporations: The Compelling Case of the Benefit
Corporation’s Right to the Free Exercise of Religion (With a Post-Hobby Lobby Epilogue), 39 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 819, 834–35 (2015):
If, however, the shareholders were subsequently to disagree on the desired goal of the
corporation, with one group seeking profit maximization and the other seeking another
goal, the presumption of most courts would be in favor of profit maximization . . . . To
the extent the promotion of religion were to negatively and materially deviate from the
interests of the shareholders, the shareholders would have a number of claims against
the traditional for-profit corporation’s board of directors.
244. The idea of contracting out of fiduciary duties refers to various possible actions or
provisions such as charter provisions and shareholder agreements. See DeMott, supra note 217, at
921. For literature arguing that fiduciary duties in the business corporation can be modified or
waived, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 219. For
literature on the other side of this debate, see Baird & Henderson, supra note 229, at 1315
(“[I]nvestors cannot easily opt out of a fiduciary duty once it is put in place.”); cf. STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 316 (3d ed. 2012) (noting in the context of takeover
defenses: “[S]tate law arguably does not permit corporate organic documents to redefine the
directors’ fiduciary duties. In general, a charter amendment may not derogate from common law
rules if doing so conflicts with some settled public policy.”).
245. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1470 (1989) (“The core fiduciary rules which govern the close corporation are mandatory, but
private rules that do not present the dangers of systematic unforeseeability and exploitation—
such as rules that allow an interested director to be counted toward a quorum—normally will be
given effect.”). Professor Eisenberg cited the following cases: Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867–
68 (3d Cir. 1968); Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952); Abeles v. Adams Eng’g Co., 173 A.2d 246,
255 (N.J. 1961). State statutes permit the certificate of incorporation to limit or eliminate the
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enforced fiduciary duties in the context of traditional issues such as selfdealing; it is not clear how courts would or should treat non-economic
issues such as religious exercise in the structure of business
corporations.246
C. Corporate Law Participants and Reliance on
External Regulations for Protection of Non-shareholders
Another issue regarding the fit between state corporate law and
modern rights doctrine concerns the topic of corporate law participants.
Corporations have multiple types of participants and stakeholders, for
example: shareholders, directors, officers, employees, suppliers,
creditors, and customers.247 Corporate law, however, focuses only on
shareholders, directors, and officers. Other participants and
stakeholders are protected by, or are the subject of, other areas of law
such as labor and employment law, contract law, and consumer
protection law. These other participants and stakeholders may
constitute an important part of the corporation, or perhaps better said,
of corporate activity,248 but corporate law itself does not traditionally
govern these relationships.249
In Hobby Lobby, the Court belied its lack of understanding
concerning who constitutes the subjects of corporate law, by including
employees in its statement:
An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way
or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example, extending

directors’ personal liability for duty of care violations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2015).
246. Other forms of business associations, such as LLCs and benefit corporations, might more
clearly allow for opting out of traditional fiduciary duties or using a different standard. See Mohsen
Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly
Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 560–64 (2012) (discussing fiduciary duties under
alternative entity law); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407,
417–18 (1999) (arguing for freedom of contract in unincorporated entities); Dana Brakman Reiser,
Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 685–92 (2013) (discussing how social
enterprise creates a specialized form for pursuing a dual mission); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your
Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 37–39 (2012) (discussing fiduciary duties in benefit corporations).
247. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 4–7 (1991) (discussing the various “inputs” of the corporate enterprise).
248. See GREENFIELD, supra note 58, at 142 (“The notion that corporations depend on multiple
stakeholders is implicit in most theories of the firm and is not particularly contentious.”).
249. See Strine, supra note 100, at 153 (“The whole design of corporate law in the United
States is built around the relationship between corporate managers and stockholders, not
relationships with other constituencies.”).
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Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees
and others associated with the company. Protecting corporations from government
seizure of their property without just compensation protects all those who have a stake in
the corporations’ financial well-being. And protecting the free-exercise rights of
corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the
humans who own and control those companies.250

In fact, corporate law does not specify the rights and obligations
of employees.251 The business judgment rule leaves discretion to the
board of directors to consider a wide range of interests in the
management of a corporation,252 some states have constituency statutes
that allow for the consideration of non-shareholder interests,253 and as
discussed above, fiduciary duties are often articulated as being owed to
the corporation and its shareholders,254 but corporate law does not
actually have substantive content on employees. That is left to common
law agency as well as labor and employment law.255
Some countries’ systems of corporate governance give a voice to
employees within the corporation, most notably in Germany’s system of
“codetermination,” which gives employees seats on works councils and

250. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (emphasis in original).
251. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283
(1998) (“Workers have no role, or almost no role, in the dominant contemporary narrative of
corporate law.”); Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 429 (2011) (“[C]orporate law does nothing to encourage any role for
employees in corporate governance.”); see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 208 (2001) (“American corporate law ignores
workers. They don’t figure into the structure of the corporation or its legal duties. But there is no
one group of people more identified with a corporation and more responsible for its day-to-day
conduct than corporate workers.”); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of
Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (arguing the interests of workers
were removed from the core concerns of corporate law over the course of the twentieth century and
that corporate law gradually transformed to focus on “the interests of shareholders vis-à-vis
managers ultimately to the exclusion of all other corporate constituencies”).
252. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 300–01 (1999); see GREENFIELD, supra note 58, at 226 (arguing that the business
judgment rule “is a necessary corrective to the irrationality of the underlying [fiduciary] duty” and
it “empowers them to act more rationally” and “to take into account a broader range of factors”).
253. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 585 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:
Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16 (1992).
254. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280, 1287 (Del. 1989);
Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); cf. MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2010) (stating each member of the board shall
act “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”).
255. See MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARK J. ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1
(1999) (“Although human capital is widely acknowledged to be the most important asset of many
firms, its role has been treated as a labor issue and not as a central concern of corporate
governance.”).
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supervisory boards.256 Scholars have debated the merits of participatory
management that includes employees in decisionmaking for the
corporation, and vociferous participants have contributed to both
sides,257 but as a practical matter in the United States proposals for
change have never succeeded, perhaps because of the stickiness of the
default status quo and the idea that it would increase the cost of
decisionmaking and lead to inefficiencies in the well-oiled corporate
form.258 Furthermore, major changes that could increase companies’
costs raise questions about national competitiveness in a global
marketplace and other unintended consequences.259
Because state corporate law does not include employees within
the governance framework, give them a voice in the corporation, or
protect their interests, it is particularly important that external
employee-protective laws be given effect. Employees and investors

256. Codetermination exists within a dual board structure in which employees participate in
a supervisory board that appoints a managing board, which in turn actively oversees the
corporation. Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy 4–
8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 18, 2004).
257. See, e.g., Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 965 (1993) (arguing
for legal reform requiring labor participation in corporate governance); Brett H. McDonnell,
Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
334, 334 (2008) (arguing for employee primacy in corporate decision-making); see also GREENFIELD,
supra note 58, at 146–52 (arguing for “participatory, democratic corporate governance”);
PARKINSON, supra note 90, at 397–434 (examining the main arguments in support of employee
participation in order to subject companies to “internal democratization”); Bainbridge, supra note
190, at 1060–75 (arguing that participatory management increases decision-making and agency
costs and public corporation decision-making should thus be done on a representative basis by one
constituency, and it should be shareholders, because they are residual claimants “generally united
by a desire to maximize share value” and hold less diverse interests than employees).
258. See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 166, at 44:
In theory it would be possible to have all classes of patrons share in collective decision
making . . . . But because the participants are likely to have radically diverging
interests, making everybody an owner threatens to increase the costs of collective
decision making enormously. Indeed, one of the strongest indications of the high costs
of collective decision making is the nearly complete absence of large firms in which
ownership is shared among two or more different types of patrons, such as customers
and suppliers or investors and workers.
See also Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities,
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 163–93 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,
1999) (considering whether codetermination in Germany has raised the cost of collective decision
making and altered corporate dynamics to a multiplayer game in which management’s power is
strengthened).
259. See BLAIR & ROE, supra note 255, at 13 (“[L]ifetime employment, codetermination, and
other institutions may have been adopted to solve one problem but then had costs or unintended
benefits.”); PARKINSON, supra note 90, at 433–34 (“[A]ny changes designed to increase corporate
social responsiveness that are liable to add significantly to companies’ costs cannot in an
increasingly global marketplace be safely introduced in one country.”).
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provide labor and capital, the two principal inputs to the firm.260
Employees are often in a vulnerable position, however, because they
make a firm-specific investment of their human capital but have no
future claim on the economic surpluses of the firm.261
Yet giving effect to external employee-protective law is exactly
what Hobby Lobby failed to do—it put the interests of five shareholders
above those of over 13,000 employees. As Delaware Chief Justice Leo
Strine has commented, Hobby Lobby revived corporate paternalism by
ruling that “the worker’s right—as a minimum benefit of employment
in a secular society—to make choices about her own medical needs is
trumped by the employer’s right to ensure that any funds from its
coffers are not used in ways that the employer finds objectionable.”262
Hobby Lobby thereby upset the implicit agreement that allows
corporate law to serve as enabling rules for shareholders and directors
because of the assurance that external legal regimes would address the
interests of others. Even Milton Friedman, who famously wrote that
“[t]he social responsibility of business is to increase its profits,”
recognized that such unabashed pursuit of profit for shareholders was
to be done “while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in the law and those embodied in ethical custom.”263
Hobby Lobby is a landmark decision because, for the first time,
the Court allowed business corporations to opt out of generally
applicable federal regulation because of the beliefs of the shareholders.
The case is about opting out and should not be confused with corporate
social responsibility.264 Corporate social responsibility concerns putting
nonshareholder interests ahead of those of shareholders in order to
surpass the requirements of the law; by contrast, Hobby Lobby was
about allowing corporations to avoid complying with the law.265 Citizens
United further compounds the problem because corporate political
260. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit
Between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 121, 121
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
261. Margaret M. Blair, Firm Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 255, at 58, 63–67.
262. Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: Hobby Lobby and the Judicial Revival of
Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2555816 [https://perma.cc/KM25-J5BX].
263. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 1970, at 32, 33.
264. See Pollman, supra note 163, at 149–72 (criticizing corporate law scholars’ claims that
Hobby Lobby is “a win for progressive values because of its recognition that business corporations
can pursue goals other than shareholder profits”).
265. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2015)
(arguing that “businesses, scholars, and courts increasingly incorporate the central premises of
Lochner into religious liberty doctrine”).
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spending may undermine the ability of “the regulatory process [to
serve] as an adequate safeguard against corporate overreaching for
non-stockholder constituencies and society generally.”266 In other
words, Hobby Lobby and Citizens United have given new cause for
concern that we can no longer rely on external regulation to constrain
corporations in the interests of society.267
Because Hobby Lobby rests on statutory grounds rather than the
First Amendment, Congress could amend RFRA to clarify that the
statute does not include business corporations within its reach.
Notwithstanding the issue of political viability, this fix should be made
to preserve the equilibrium—a social compact—established in corporate
law to rely on and require business corporations to comply with external
regulations. This allocation of roles for different areas of law has
allowed corporate law to be enabling and value creating—for
corporations to serve as “great engines for the promotion of the public
convenience, and for the development of public wealth.”268
If this disruption in the social compact is not fixed, that suggests
corporate law may need to adapt to the new role with which it has been
tasked. If the interests of employees are not protected outside of
corporate law, they may need to be addressed within.269 As discussed
266. Strine & Walter, supra note 201, at 342; see also David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice
Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1197, 1236 (2011) (arguing after Citizens United that “[i]f we cannot rely on contract or external
regulation to protect the interests of non-shareholders, then shareholder primacy must be altered
in favor of a system that requires corporate directors to attend to the interests of non-shareholding
stakeholders at the level of firm governance”). For a contrary view, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night-Watchman State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39
(2015).
267. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the
People’s” Ability to Constrain our Corporate Creations, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2016) (abstract of manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2680294 [https://perma.cc/M7JP-J5KM]:
Taken together, the decisions of the Roberts Court and other like-minded federal judges
have had the practical effect of increasing the power of corporations to influence the
electoral and regulatory process, diminishing the ability of human citizens to constrain
their corporate creations in the public interest, and reducing the practical ability of
Congress and executive agencies to adopt and implement externality regulations and
new social welfare regulation.
268. Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888) (noting, however, that a corporation that
acted outside of its charter became a “public menace”); see GREENFIELD, supra note 58, at 130–31
(noting corporations are “especially able to create financial prosperity” and that the “unique
characteristics” making this possible are “creations of law” that would not be available without the
state); id. at 133 (“[C]orporations should be appreciated for their special ability to create wealth
but should be treated warily because of their inability (absent regulation) to take into account
values far more important than wealth.”).
269. For an argument that we need “a more serious endeavor to reach common ground” in
corporate governance between management and labor, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common
Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More
Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2007). For an argument for a
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above, corporate law is not currently well suited for this sort of work
and so changes could potentially be of a fundamental nature.
CONCLUSION
A new dynamic has emerged between federal corporate rights
and state corporate law. Whereas state corporate law historically
served as a means of constraining and regulating corporations, now it
establishes the procedures by which business corporations exercise
certain expressive and religious federal rights. Modern corporate rights
jurisprudence has come to this result through a flawed understanding
of corporations and an unreflective reliance on corporate law.
In some regards, the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately
comprehend corporations and their regulation is unsurprising. A long
tradition exists of criticizing the Court on these grounds.270 Yet, as this
Article has shown, the recent shift in corporate rights jurisprudence has
broken new ground. Never before has the Court allowed business
corporations to opt out of generally applicable federal regulation
because of the beliefs of their shareholders. The Court has granted
corporations the power to make unlimited independent political
expenditures, subject only to the check of corporate governance.
There may be few, if any, alternatives to the new dynamic
between federal corporate rights and state corporate law. Once the
Supreme Court recognized corporations as having expressive and
religious liberty rights, it was perhaps inevitable that the Court would
turn to corporate law as the substantive law governing procedures and
disputes. To do otherwise might risk judicially creating a federal
common law of corporations or an even more intrusive
“constitutionalizing” of corporate law.
Some of the new questions and issues that have arisen from the
expansion of corporate rights have been and may continue to be dealt
with by federal agencies. But to the extent that corporate governance is
not further federalized, the weight of the new tasks for corporate law
rests on state corporate law.
These observations also suggest important issues looming on the
horizon. The Court is dangerously close to not just giving state
“democratic agenda” in reforming corporate law, see Allan C. Hutchison, Hurly-Berle—Corporate
Governance, Commercial Profits, and Democratic Deficits, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1219, 1220
(2011).
270. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does–Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY
L.J. 83, 139 (2002); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809–14 (1935).
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corporate law a quasi-constitutional dimension, but actually conflating
ordinary commercial corporations with expressive associations and
subjecting corporate and securities law to heightened scrutiny.271 Also,
the recent uproar over state legislation allowing for religiously-based
discrimination,272 serves as a reminder of the ability of states to act as
laboratories and the potential havoc this can wreak. Just as states
experiment with new forms of business organization such as benefit
corporations, theoretically they could also provide rules regarding
which types of corporations have the power, or do not have the power,
to exercise religion or make political expenditures. Would such laws, redefining various business organizations and their characteristics, pass
constitutional muster? They would pit the long recognized power of
states to create and define corporations against principles of federalism.
The existing, and potentially increasing, lack of uniformity across
corporate law of the fifty states would seem to heighten the problems
identified in this Article. These and other potential issues help sharpen
the focus on just how far the Court has gone in re-shaping the role of
corporate law.

271. See POST, supra note 207, at 70:
State corporate laws pervasively regulate how persons may join together to form a
corporation and how they must act together once they are members of a corporation. If
there were a First Amendment right to associate to form ordinary commercial
corporations, . . . every aspect of state corporate law would be subject to strict First
Amendment scrutiny.
For an example of a court applying strict scrutiny to a law setting out internal decision making
procedures for corporations and unions to make campaign contributions or independent
expenditures, see Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2012). The court enjoined enforcement of the provision as unlikely to withstand strict scrutiny. Id.
at 15.
272. See Michael Barbaro & Erick Eckholm, Indiana Law Denounced as Invitation to
Discriminate Against Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/us/
politics/indiana-law-denounced-as-invitation-to-discriminate-against-gays.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/SZ8R-SGDZ]; Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154
(2014).
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